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Aboriginal and Treaty Rights and 
Violence Against Women
JOHN BORROWS *
Violence against Indigenous women is a crisis of national proportions. Unfortunately, Indigenous 
peoples have been prevented from arguing that Indigenous communities are a constitutional 
site of activity for dealing with such violence. This article suggests that Aboriginal and treaty 
rights under section 35 of the Constitution could play a signifi cant role in ensuring that all levels 
of government are seized with the responsibility for dealing with violence against women. 
This article explores how section 35 could be reinterpreted in ways that place issues of 
gender and violence at the heart of its analysis.
La violence faite aux femmes autochtones est une crise d’échelle nationale. Malheureusement, 
on ne permet pas aux autochtones de faire valoir que leurs collectivités constituent un 
endroit constitutionel ou on peut s’occuper de cette violence. Cet article suggère que les 
droits autochtones et les droits issus des traités, reconnus et confi rmés par l’article 35 de 
la Constitution, pourraient jouer un rôle important pour faire en sorte que tous les paliers de 
gouvernement soient saisis de la responsabilité d’aborder la violence faite aux femmes. Cet 
article se penche sur la manière dont l’article 35 pourrait être réinterprété afi n qu’il intègre 
au cœur de son analyse les questions de sexe et de violence.
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like to thank the following friends and colleagues for their helpful comments on earlier 
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Lindsay Borrows, Gillian Calder, Jamie Cameron, Sarah Deer, Sonia Lawrence, Constance 
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INDIGENOUS WOMEN IN CANADA are beaten, sexually assaulted, and killed in 
shockingly high numbers.1 Th ey experience violence at rates three times higher 
than other women.2 Th is violence is also extremely brutal in comparison  to that 
experienced by the general population.3 Indigenous women are fi ve times more 
likely to be killed or to disappear as compared to non-Indigenous women.4 Th ey 
also experience much higher rates of intimate partner violence than other women.5 
Incarceration rates of Indigenous women are also greater than those of the 
general population of women due, in part, to their response to this violence.6 
Th ere is a crisis in Canada’s criminal justice system relating to this issue,7 yet 
there has been no signifi cant constitutional response despite recommendations 
1. “In 2009, close to 67,000 Aboriginal women aged 15 or older living in the Canadian 
provinces reported being the victim of violence in the previous 12 months. Overall, the 
rate of self-reported violent victimization among Aboriginal women was almost three times 
higher than the rate of violent victimization reported by non-Aboriginal women. Close to 
two-thirds (63%) of Aboriginal female victims were aged 15 to 34. Th is age group accounted 
for just under half (47%) of the female Aboriginal population (aged 15 or older) living in 
the ten provinces.” See Statistics Canada, Violent victimization of Aboriginal women in the 
Canadian provinces, 2009 by Shannon Brennan (Ottawa: StatCan, 17 May 2011) at 5, 
online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/article/11439-eng.pdf> [Statistics 
Canada]. For further commentary, see Anita Olsen Harper, “Is Canada Peaceful and Safe for 
Aboriginal Women?” (2006) 25:1-2 Can Woman Stud 33 at 33, 36-37.
2. Statistics Canada, ibid at 7. For a more general discussion of Aboriginal women and the 
law, see Patricia Monture, “Standing Against Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race, 
Culture, and Gender” in Elizabeth Comack, ed, Locating Law: Race/Class/Gender/Sexuality 
Connections, 2d ed (Halifax: Fernwood, 2006) at 73-94.
3. See generally Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Th e Justice System and 
Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, vol 1 (Winnipeg: 
Queen’s Printer, 1991) at 475-87 (Chairs: AC Hamilton & CM Sinclair) [Aboriginal Justice 
Inquiry of Manitoba].
4. Amnesty International, “No More Stolen Sisters: Th e Need for a Comprehensive Response 
to Discrimination and Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada” (London: 
Amnesty International, 2009) at 1, online: <http://www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/fi les/
amr200122009enstolensistersupdate.pdf>. 
5. Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Victimization and off ending among the 
Aboriginal population in Canada, vol 26:3 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2006), online: <http://
publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/Statcan/85-002-XIE-002-XIE2006003.pdf>.
6. Patricia Monture-Angus, “Women and risk: Aboriginal women, colonialism, and correctional 
practice” (1999) 19:1-2 Can Woman Stud 24; Fran Sugar & Lana Fox, “Nistum Peyako 
Seht’wawin Iskwewak: Breaking Chains” (1989-1990) 3:2 CJWL 465.
7. R v Gladue, 1999 SCC 679 at para 64, [1999] 1 SCR 688.
III. ALTERNATIVE SECTION 35(1) INTERPRETATIONS: (AB)ORIGINALISM AND LIVING TREES ........... 729
IV. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................... 736
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in numerous high profi le government reports.8 While federal legislative action 
has directed judges to consider the special circumstances of Aboriginal peoples 
in some instances,9 these eff orts are woefully inadequate in addressing broader 
issues of violence against women within and beyond Indigenous communities.10 
At the same time, Indigenous women have demonstrated great leadership 
in bringing issues of violence more fully into the public spotlight.11 Th ey have 
established shelters, arranged counselling, organized vigils, volunteered in 
8. See Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr, Prosecution, Digest of 
Findings and Recommendations (Halifax: Th e Commission, 1989) (Chair: T Alexander 
Hickman); Ontario, Th e Osnaburgh-Windigo Tribal Council Justice Review Committee, 
Report of the Osnaburgh-Windigo Tribal Council Review Committee (Toronto: Government 
of Ontario, 1990) (Chair: Alan Grant); Canada, Law Reform Commission of Canada, 
Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice: Equality, Respect and the Search for Justice 
(Ottawa: Th e Commission, 1991); Manitoba, Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Report 
of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba: Th e Justice System and Aboriginal People, vol 1 
(Winnipeg: Th e Inquiry, 1991); Alberta, Task Force on the Criminal Justice System and its 
Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force 
on the Criminal Justice System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta, vol 
1 (Edmonton: Th e Task Force, 1991); Saskatchewan, Indian Justice Review Committee, 
Report of the Saskatchewan Indian Justice Review Committee (Regina: Th e Committee, 1992) 
(Chair: Patricia Linn); British Columbia, Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry, Report on 
the Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry (Victoria: Cariboo-Chilcotin Justice Inquiry, 1993) 
(Commissioner: Anthony Sarich); Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
Bridging the Cultural Divide: Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada 
(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996); Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
People, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Gathering Strength, vol 3 
(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 54; Saskatchewan, Commission on First 
Nations and Metis Peoples and Justice, Legacy of Hope: An Agenda for Change (Saskatoon, 
Th e Commission, 2004); Ontario, Ministry of the Attorney General, Report of the Ipperwash 
Inquiry (Toronto, Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2007).
9. See Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 718.2(e). For further discussion of this issue, see 
Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, “Sentencing Aboriginal Off enders: Balancing Off enders’ Needs, the 
Interests of Victims and Society, and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples” (2007) 19:1 
CJWL 179.
10. Th ere is a “near fatal lack of resources” available for dealing with violence on reserves. 
See Anne McGillivray & Brenda Comaskey, Black Eyes All of the Time: Intimate Violence, 
Aboriginal Women, and the Justice System (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) 
at 79-80. See also Angela Cameron, “R v Gladue: Sentencing and the Gendered Impacts 
of Colonialism” in John D Whyte, ed, Moving Toward Justice (Saskatoon: Purich, 2008) 
160; Angela Cameron, “Sentencing Circles and Intimate Violence: A Canadian Feminist 
Perspective” (2006) 18 CJWL 479.
11. Neil Andersson et al, “Rebuilding from Resilience: Research Framework for a Randomized 
Controlled Trial of Community-led Interventions to Prevent Domestic Violence in 
Aboriginal Communities” (2010) 8:2 Pimatisiwin 61.
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clinics, coordinated media campaigns, appeared before parliamentary committees, 
cultivated the arts, worked in the civil service, and been elected as chiefs and 
councilors—all with a fi rm public resolve to end violence against women.12 Th e 
Native Women’s Association of Canada has long been at the forefront of these 
eff orts.13 Its advocacy, research, and on-the-ground eff orts have made a huge 
diff erence for thousands of people.14 In fact, Indigenous women across the country 
have creatively developed detailed policy proposals and grassroots models 
for dealing with violence against women.15 Th eir work includes support for 
Indigenous self-determination that recognizes and affi  rms women’s rights.16 Th e 
12. For example, see Native Women’s Association of Canada, online: <http://www.nwac.ca/
media> (for information about the broad array of activities undertaken by Indigenous 
women to deal with the violence against women). See also National Aboriginal Circle Against 
Family Violence, “Ending Violence in Aboriginal Communities: Best Practices” (Ottawa: 
National Aboriginal Circle Against Family Violence, 2005).
13. Recently, the Assembly of First Nations has also become more active in addressing 
violence against women. See “Demanding Justice and Fulfi lling Rights: A Strategy to End 
Violence Against Indigenous Women & Girls,” online: <http://www.afn.ca/uploads/fi les/
misssing_and_murdered_indigenous_women/afn_draft_strategy_to_ensure_rights_of_
indigenous_women_&_girls_e.pdf>.
14. Th e work of the Native Women’s Association of Canada was very signifi cant in securing 
Indian status for hundreds of thousands of people who were disenfranchised on a sexually 
discriminatory basis. See Janet Silman, Enough is Enough: Aboriginal Women Speak Out 
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1987). Loss of status made Aboriginal women more vulnerable to 
violence because of the precarious position in which they were placed relative to Indian men. 
Indian women’s inability to reside or own property on reserve, participate in the political 
life of the community, and access the support of extended family and kin exposed them 
to greater challenges in confronting and fl eeing abuse. Th e work of the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada and their allies helped address some of these challenges. See McIvor v 
Canada (Registrar, Indian and Northern Aff airs), 2009 BCCA 153, 306 DLR (4th) 193.
15. For examples of advocacy, see Native Women’s Association of Canada, “What Th eir Stories 
Tell Us: Research fi ndings from the Sisters In Spirit initiative” (Ottawa: 2010), online: 
<http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/fi les/imce/2010_NWAC_SIS_Report_EN_Lite.pdf> 
[What Th eir Stories Tell Us]; Jeannette Corbiere Lavell, “Statement of the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada et al.: Combating violence against Indigenous women and girls, 
Article 22 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (delivered 
at the Eleventh Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New York, NY, 
7-18 May 2012), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/fi les/imce/UNPFII%20
11th%20Session%20-NWAC%20and%20AFN%20Statement%20on%20VAIWG%20
-%20May%2010%202012.pdf>. For protocols dealing with sexual violence in Aboriginal 
communities, see Jarem Sawatsky, Th e Ethic of Traditional Communities and the Spirit of 
Healing Justice: Studies from Hollow Water, the Iona Community, and Plum Village (London, 
UK: Jessica Kingsley, 2009).
16. Sharon McIvor, “Aboriginal Women’s Rights as “Existing Rights” (1995) 15:2-3 Can Woman 
Stud 34.
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knowledge and experience of these women—and, in particular, their poignant 
calls for structural change—must be heeded.17  
Despite these eff orts, violence against women has not received the attention 
it deserves. Political discourse within Indigenous communities is strongly 
infl uenced by how Indigenous issues have been framed by the courts. In particular, 
section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 198218 has taken centre stage in these 
debates. It has spawned a political approach that largely emphasizes land and 
resource confl icts between the Crown and Indigenous governments to the exclusion 
of other human rights issues. As a result, too many chiefs and leaders have 
become overly focused on issues recognized by the courts, inadvertently drawing 
attention away from pressing structural inequalities related to violence against 
Indigenous women. On the one hand, it is not unreasonable for leaders to devote 
their attention to matters that have gained broader legal traction in the judicial 
realm, because Canadian governments do not generally respond to Indigenous 
issues unless courts compel them to take action. On the other hand, since the 
courts are not particularly sensitive to Indigenous peoples’ lived realities, Indigenous 
leaders must ensure that their political agendas are not solely dictated by what 
judges regard as being central to section 35(1) jurisprudence. 
To help refocus Indigenous political discourse surrounding section 35(1), 
this article argues that Indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights must be 
reframed and transformed in ways that address other pressing needs including, 
most importantly, violence against women. Th is reframing should be done with 
the recognition that, beyond the results of formal litigation, section 35(1) has 
great signifi cance for political struggles both external and internal to Indigenous 
communities.19 As such, this article explores the connections between Indigenous 
17. For commentary on Native women’s advocacy related to violence against women, see Native 
Women’s Association of Canada, “Gendering Reconciliation, Arrest the Legacy, From 
Residential Schools to Prisons” (Ottawa, 2012), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/gendering-
reconciliation>; Wendee Kubik, Carrie Bourassa & Mary Hampton, “Stolen Sisters, 
Second Class Citizens, Poor Health: Th e Legacy of Colonization in Canada” (2009) 33:1-2 
Humanity & Soc’y 18.
18. Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Constitution Act].
19. In a related context, the political nature of constitutional discourse is discussed in Joel 
Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1997); Alan Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Laws and Rights (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995); Ted Morton & Rainer Knopf, Th e Charter Revolution and 
the Court Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Michael Mandel, Th e Charter 
of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Th ompson, 1989); Christopher 
Manfredi, Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001); Andrew Petter, Th e Politics of the Charter: Th e 
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governance and violence against women while placing these issues more squarely 
in a political light. It argues that Indigenous communities should be regarded 
as possessing shared constitutional responsibility for addressing violence against 
women. Unless section 35(1) becomes a site of political action related to violence 
against women, Indigenous women and their allies will not be suffi  ciently 
empowered to aff ect the development of the national and local policies necessary 
to create lasting change.20 
Part I of this article discusses why responsibility for addressing violence 
against women has not been considered as lying within the sphere of section 
35(1) and outlines critical responses to these concerns. Part II analyzes the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s (SCC) exceedingly narrow interpretation of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights and considers why jurisdiction related to violence against women 
would not likely be affi  rmed under the SCC’s current dominant interpretive 
approach. Part III identifi es alternative means of recognizing and affi  rming 
Indigenous peoples’ responsibilities for dealing with violence against women within 
existing section 35(1) jurisprudence. Canada’s Constitution could readily embrace 
approaches that put the health, well-being, and safety of Indigenous women at 
the centre of community life. If decision makers were willing to treat Indigenous 
rights not only as fl owing from historic sources but also as rooted in contemporary 
jurisdictional concerns, section 35(1) could make a signifi cant diff erence to 
everyday political discourse and practice concerning violence against women. 
I. THE PROBLEM AND/OR THE ANSWER?: INDIGENOUS 
SELF-DETERMINATION AND VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN
Law infl uences and is intertwined with politics;21 thus, any attempt to change 
the discourse relating to violence against women within and beyond Indigenous 
Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
20. “For Indigenous women, the systematic violation of their collective rights as Indigenous 
People is the single greatest risk factor for gender based violence – including violence 
perpetrated within their communities.” See Mairin Iwanka Raya, “Indigenous Women Stand 
Against Violence: A Companion Report to the United Nations Secretary-General’s Study on 
Violence Against Women” (International Indigenous Women’s Forum:
New York, 2006) at 7, online: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfi i/documents/
vaiwreport06.pdf>. 
21.  Robert A Williams Jr, “Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice,” (1997) 95:4 Mich 
Law Rev 741; Robert A Williams Jr, “Taking Rights Aggressively: Th e Perils and Promise of 
Critical Legal Th eory for Peoples of Color,” (1987) 5:1 L & Inequality 103.
BORROWS, ABORIGINAL & TREATY RIGHTS 705
communities must address the question: Why is there no section 35(1) jurispru-
dence dealing with this issue? At one level, the answer is simple: Section 35(1) 
does not specifi cally deal with violence against Indigenous women because, thus 
far, courts have not construed these powers as falling within Indigenous peoples’ 
jurisdiction. At another level, there is no jurisprudence recognizing Indigenous 
jurisdiction in this fi eld because Indigenous communities are not fully trusted 
to deal eff ectively with violence against women.22 Th ese two issues, jurisdiction 
and trust, are intertwined, and the relationship between them cannot be easily 
disentangled. For example, if Indigenous peoples attempted to assume fuller legal 
responsibility related to violence against women, a lack of offi  cial recognition 
would leave them without the resources and broader support necessary to realize 
tangible change related to actual on-the-ground attitudes, activity, and service 
delivery. Resulting failures would further fuel negative perceptions of Indigenous 
justice and diminish government and community willingness to support offi  cial 
recognition of jurisdiction in the future. Understanding the vital connection 
between active, supportive recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction and its proper 
implementation should reinforce our awareness of the fact that law and politics are 
not distinct fi elds. Th is article therefore contextualizes violence against women in 
a broader constitutional light. 23
Th us, if communities are going to deal eff ectively with violence against 
women, it is essential to interrogate why Indigenous peoples currently lack 
offi  cial jurisdictional recognition in this fi eld. Th e fi rst point to note is that the 
failure to recognize Indigenous governance is part of a broader dilemma that 
Indigenous people encounter before the courts. Th e SCC has limited its discus-
sion of Indigenous governance to very few cases and has not, contrary to its 
own admonition, taken a large, liberal and generous approach to this issue.24 For 
22. See e.g. Teressa Nahanee, “Dancing with a Gorilla: Aboriginal Women, Justice & the 
Charter” (Paper delivered at the Round Table on Justice Issues 2004-2005), online: <http://
www.nwac.ca/sites/default/fi les/reports/DancingwithaGorilla.pdf>; Th omas Flanagan, First 
Nations? Second Th oughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2000); Frances Widdowson & 
Albert Howard, Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry: Th e Deception Behind Indigenous Cultural 
Preservation (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2008).
23. Val Napoleon discusses the need for a broader political and gendered analysis of Indigenous 
issues. See “Aboriginal Feminism in a Wider Frame” (2007) 41:3 Canadian Dimension 44. 
24. Th e SCC has held that Aboriginal and treaty rights should be construed in broad ways 
that favour Aboriginal interpretations. See R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at para 9, 
137 DLR (4th) 648; R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 [Van der 
Peet cited to SCR]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010, 153 DLR (4th) 
193 [Delgamuukw cited to SCR]; R v Sappier; R v Gray, 2006 SCC 54, 274 DLR (4th) 75 
[Sappier]; R v Taylor and Williams, 34 OR (2d) 360, [1981] 3 CNLR 114 (CA) [Taylor and 
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example, in R v Pamajewon, the fi rst decision to discuss Indigenous governance 
explicitly under section 35(1), the SCC held that Indigenous communities could 
not claim broad management rights over reserve lands.25 While the Court’s reasons 
have not escaped critical commentary,26 this narrow framing all but halted 
the advancement of successful self-governance claims under section 35(1).27 Th e 
Pamajewon decision was reinforced one year later in Delgamuukw v Th e Queen, 
in which the SCC declined to address issues related to self-governance because 
of the “diffi  cult conceptual issues” raised by this claim.28 Both of these decisions 
Williams cited to OR]; R v Simon, [1985] 2 SCR 387, 24 DLR (4th) 390 [Simon cited to 
SCR]; R v Horseman, [1990] 1 SCR 901 at paras 2-4, 4 WWR 97 [Horseman]; R v Badger, 
[1996] 1 SCR 771 at paras 4, 41, 133 DLR (4th) 324 [Badger]; R v Sundown, [1999] 1 
SCR 393 at paras 24-25, 170 DLR (4th) 385 [Sundown]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 
at paras 9-14, 177 DLR (4th) 513 [Marshall]; R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 533 at para 19, 
179 DLR (4th) 193; R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 SCR 220 at para 
26 [R v Marshall; R v Bernard]; R v Morris, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 SCR 915 at para 19 
[Morris]. Th e leading cases in the United States applying similar canons of construction are 
United States v Winans, 198 US 371, 371 NE (2d) 127 (1905); Winters v United States, 207 
US 564 at 576-77, 564 SE (2d) 802 (1908); Choate v Trapp, 224 US 665 at 675, 32 S Ct 
565 (1912); Carpenter v Shaw, 280 US 363 at 367, 50 S Ct 121 (1930); Choctaw Nation v 
United States, 318 US 423 at 431-32, 423 NE (2d) 900 (1943); McClanahan v Arizona State 
Tax Commission, 411 US 164 at 174, 93 S Ct 1257 (1973); Minnesota v Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians 526 US 172 at 195-98, 119 S Ct 1187 (1999).
25. R v Pamajewon, [1996] 2 SCR 821 at para 27, 138 DLR (4th) 204 [Pamajewon]. 
26. See Brian Slattery, “Th e Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 Sup Ct L 
Rev (2d) 595 [Slattery, “Th e Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights”]; Kent McNeil, 
“Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47:3 McGill LJ 473; 
Russell L Barsh & James Y Henderson, “Th e Supreme Court’s Van der Peet Trilogy: Naive 
Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42:4 McGill LJ 993; Bradford Morse, “Permafrost 
Rights: Aboriginal Self-Government and the Supreme Court in R v Pamajewon” (1997) 42:4 
McGill LJ 1011; John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and 
the Trickster” (1998) 22 Am Indian L Rev 37.
27. R v Ignace (1998), 156 DLR (4th) 713 at para 11, 103 BCAC 273; Mississaugas of Scugog 
Island First Nation v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers 
Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 444, 2007 ONCA 814, 287 DLR (4th) 452 
[Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation]; Sawridge Band v Canada, 2006 FC 1501 at 
para 42, [2006] 4 CNLR 279; Mitchell v Minister of National Revenue, 2001 SCC 33 at 
paras 125-26, [2001] 1 SCR 911 [Mitchell]; NIL/TU, Child and Family Services Society v 
BC Government and Service Employees’ Union (23 March 2006), B72/2006 at paras 54-66, 
online: BCLRB <http://www.lrb.bc.ca/decisions/B072$2006.pdf>; NIL/TU,O Child and 
Family Services Society v BC Government and Service Employees’ Union, 2010 SCC 45 at para 
80, [2010] 2 SCR 696. Note how the claim to Indigenous governance virtually disappeared 
by the time NIL/TU,O v BC Government got to the SCC because of the narrow reading of 
Pamajewon in the lower court (supra note 25).
28. Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at paras 170-71.
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created a void at the centre of section 35(1) jurisprudence. Section 35(1) allows 
communities to claim rights in relation to historically specifi c practices but has 
been interpreted in a way that simultaneously denies them the means to organize 
their broader social relationships.29 Th is has suppressed Indigenous governmental 
activity and innovation in responding to the crisis of violence against Indigenous 
women within their own communities and beyond. 
Contrast this situation with the constitutional circumstances of Native 
American tribes in the United States, which possess inherent authority to exercise 
criminal and civil jurisdiction on their reserves.30 Tribal power in the United 
States fl ows from a legally recognized, autonomous, and inherent source of sover-
eignty that existed before the country’s creation and survives to the present day.31 
While this authority is subject to the judicially created federal plenary power to 
regulate Native American aff airs32 and is constrained by legislative restrictions 
crafted in this light,33 tribes still possess substantial inherent powers related to 
their internal governance.34 For example, the US Bill of Rights35 does not apply 
directly to tribes,36 and while the federal government has passed legislation 
directing tribes to protect their members’ rights,37 these laws cannot generally be 
enforced in federal courts and, therefore, must be secured before tribal courts.38 
Th us, as a practical matter, tribes in the United States have signifi cant jurisdiction 
29. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: Aboriginal 
Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, 2012).
30. For the fi rst case dealing with tribal criminal jurisdiction, see Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 US 
556 (1883), 3 S Ct 396. For commentary on this case, see Sidney Harring, Crow Dog’s 
case: American Indian sovereignty, tribal law, and United States law in the nineteenth century 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). For the leading case dealing with tribal 
civil jurisdiction, see Williams v Lee, 358 US 217, 79 S Ct 269 (1959).
31. Johnson v McIntosh, 21 US 543, 5 L Ed 681 (1823); Cherokee Nation v State of Georgia, 30 
US 1, 8 L Ed 25 (1831). Th ese principles were reaffi  rmed in United States v Lara, 541 US 
193, 124 S Ct 1628 (2004).
32. For critical discussions of the plenary power, see Nell Jessup Newton, “Federal Power Over 
Indians: Its Scope, Sources and Limitations” (1984) 132:2 U Pa L Rev 195; Philip P Frickey, 
“Domesticating Federal Indian Law” (1996) 81 Minn L Rev 31:1; Robert N Clinton, “Th ere 
is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes” (2002) 34:1 Ariz St LJ 113; David H 
Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier: Th e New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law” (1996) 84:6 Cal L Rev 1573.
33. Th e Major Crimes Act, 18 USC § 1153 (1885) (outlining some of these limits).
34. United States v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 98 S Ct 1079 (1978).
35. US Const amends I-X.
36. Talton v Mayes, 163 US 376, 16 S Ct 986 (1896).
37. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(8) (1968).
38. Santa Clara Pueblo v Martinez, 436 US 49, 98 S Ct 1670 (1978).
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to legislate and adjudicate issues related to violence against women.39 As a result, 
tribes and tribal courts have taken important steps in addressing this issue even 
as substantial work remains to be done.40 Th e recognition that legal rights vest 
Indigenous governments with responsibilities for dealing with violence against 
women greatly aids political action in this fi eld.   
Unfortunately, Indigenous women in Canada are denied similar rights and 
corresponding access to political power, both of which are essential to their 
safety and to their communities’ broader health. Th is must change. Indigenous 
peoples must be regarded as partners in Confederation who are capable of 
exercising jurisdiction related to the country’s most pressing social and political 
issues.41 Th ey cannot eff ectively participate in the creation of healthy societies 
if they do not have the jurisdictional tools to address the violence and social dys-
function that plague too many communities. While the exercise of such power will 
not eradicate violence against women (the causes of and solutions to which go 
much deeper than constitutional reform), social distress could nevertheless be 
modestly yet meaningfully curtailed if authority and resources were available 
to address violence against women.42 Unless Indigenous governance structures, 
such as councils, courts, and clans, address issues central to the safety of 
Indigenous women, they will continue to be marginalized within Canada and 
within their communities.43 Violence against women does not only arise from 
poor interpersonal relationships; rather, it is connected to larger social structures 
of inequality that can be found in any society.44 Violence against women is, 
therefore, intimately linked with the broader colonial context that Aboriginal 
rights are designed to address.45 Without recognizing the links between violence 
39. For a general overview of the issue of violence against women on Indian reservations, see 
Sarah Deer et al, eds, Sharing Our Stories of Survival: Native Women Surviving Violence 
(Lanham: AltaMira, 2008).
40. Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P Zuni, “Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of 
Indigenous Women in the United States” (1995) 69 St John’s L Rev 69. 
41. Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal 
Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1993).
42. Resources are also greatly needed to deal with violence against women. For an in-depth study 
of poverty and federal policy on reserves, see Hugh Shewell, ‘Enough to Keep them Alive’: 
Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
43. Foundational fl aws resting at the base of constitutional law must be exposed, nullifi ed, and 
repaired to eff ectively address this issue. See Gordon Christie, “Judicial Justifi cation of a 
Recent Development in Aboriginal Law?” (2002) 17:2 CJLS 41.
44. See Hillary N Weaver, “Th e Colonial Context of Violence: Refl ections on Violence in the 
Lives of Native American Women” (2009) 24:9 J Interpersonal Violence 1552; Kiera L 
Ladner, “Gendering Decolonisation, Decolonising Gender” (2009) 13:1 AILR 62. 
45. For a discussion of how colonization is linked with violence against women, see Andrea 
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against Indigenous women and male-dominated colonial structures, Indigenous 
women will remain subject to staggeringly high levels of violence “since violence 
against women is one of the key means through which male control over women’s 
agency and sexuality is maintained.”46 Th us, the web of oppressive and unequal 
relationships within which Indigenous women are enmeshed must be addressed 
as part and parcel of violence against women if the issue is to work its way onto 
the constitutional agenda.47
While the recognition of Indigenous jurisdiction would be an important 
step in addressing violence against women, one might appropriately ask whether 
violence against women would receive the attention and action it deserves if 
Indigenous peoples were recognized as possessing responsibility in this fi eld.48 
To engage with this question is to acknowledge the broader issues of trust in 
Indigenous governance that lie behind the legal discourse. At present, Indigenous 
communities can be as oppressive and dismissive of this issue as other levels of 
Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, Mass: South 
End Press, 2005); Mary Ellen Turpel, “Patriarchy and Paternalism: Th e Legacy of the 
Canadian State for Women” (1993) 6:1 CJWL 174. For a discussion of how s 35(1) is 
designed to address colonialism, see R v Sparrow, [1997] 1 SCR 1075 at 412, 70 DLR (4th) 
385 [Sparrow]; Delgamuukw, supra note 24; R v Côté, [1996] 3 SCR 139 at paras 59, 177 
DLR (4th) 513 [Côté].
46. Th e connection was made at page one of the Executive Summary of a 2006 Report prepared 
for the General Assembly, detailing global violence against women. See Secretary-General, 
Ending violence against women: from words to action: Study of the Secretary General, UN Doc 
A/61/122/Add.1 (2006) at 1.
47. For extended scholarship on this issue, see the following works by Patricia A Monture: 
“Women’s Words: Power, Identity, and Indigenous Sovereignty” (2008) 26:3 Can Woman 
Stud 154; “Ka-Nin-Geh-Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Gah” (1986) 2:1 CJWL 159; Th under 
My Soul: A Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Press, 1995); “Standing Against 
Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race, Culture and Gender” (1998) 2 YBNZ Juris 7; 
“Women and Risk: Aboriginal Women, colonialism, and correctional practice” (1999) 19:1-
2 Can Woman Stud 24; “Th e Violence We Women Do: A First Nations View” in Constance 
Backhouse & David H Flaherty, eds, Challenging Times: Th e Women’s Movement in Canada 
and the United States (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) 193; “Th e Roles and 
Responsibilities of Aboriginal Women: Reclaiming Justice” (1992) 56:2 Sask L Rev 237.
48. For a discussion of the care required in asking and addressing this question, see Maneesha 
Deckha, “Gender, Diff erence, and Anti-Essentialism: Towards a Feminist Response to 
Cultural Claims in Law” in Avigail Eisenberg, ed, Diversity and Equality: Th e Changing 
Framework of Freedom in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 114; Emma LaRocque, 
“Re-examining Culturally Appropriate Models in Criminal Justice Applications” in Michael 
Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for 
Diff erence (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 75; Kim Anderson, “Affi  rmations of an Indigenous 
Feminist” in Cheryl Suzack et al, eds, Indigenous Women and Feminism: Politics, Activism, 
Culture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 81.
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government.49 As is the case with most political communities,50 male domination 
is a troubling fact of life.51 In fact, an early report of the Manitoba Justice Inquiry 
proclaimed that Indigenous political leaders were a large part of the problem in 
perpetuating violence within Indigenous communities.52 Th e Commissioners of 
the Inquiry wrote:
Th e unwillingness of chiefs and councils to address the plight of women and children 
suff ering abuse at the hands of husbands and fathers is quite alarming. We are 
concerned enough about it to state that we believe that the failure of Aboriginal 
government leaders to deal at all with the problem of domestic abuse is uncon-
scionable. We believe that there is a heavy responsibility on Aboriginal leaders to 
recognize the signifi cance of the problem within their own communities. Th ey must 
begin to recognize, as well, how much their silence and failure to act actually 
contribute to the problem.53
While these words were written over twenty years ago and constructive change 
within some Indigenous political circles has occurred over the last few decades,54 
there is no reason to believe that Indigenous communities are enlightened 
49. Th is was particularly the case during the early 1990s when constitutional discussions 
excluded Aboriginal women’s groups. See John Borrows, “Contemporary Traditional 
Equality: Th e Eff ect of the Charter on First Nations Politics” (1994) 43:1 UNBLJ 19; Sharon 
Donna McIver, “Self-Government and Aboriginal Women” in Enakshi Dua & Angela 
Robertson, eds, Scratching the Surface: Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Th ought (Toronto: 
Women’s Press, 1999) 167; Lilianne Ernestine Krosenbrink-Gelissen, Sexual Equality as an 
Aboriginal Right: Th e Native Women’s Association of Canada and the Constitutional Process on 
Aboriginal Matters, 1982-1987 (Saarbrücken: Verlag Breitenbach, 1991).
50. Carol Gilligan & David AJ Richards, Th e Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and 
Democracy’s Future (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
51. For a good overview of the struggle faced by Indigenous women in the face of male 
dominance, see Sharon McIvor, “Aboriginal Women Unmasked: Using Equality Litigation to 
Advance Women’s Rights” in Margot Young et al, eds, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and 
Legal Activism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 96. For another viewpoint, see Kim Anderson, 
“Leading by Action: Female Chiefs and the Political Landscape in Restoring the Balance” in 
Gail Guthrie Valaskakis, Madeleine Dion Stout & Eric Guimond, eds, Restoring the Balance: 
First Nations Women, Community, and Culture (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 
2009) 99.
52. For an example of the failure of some First Nations leaders in Manitoba to deal with sexual 
violence in the child welfare context see Ruth Teichroeb, Flowers on my Grave: How an 
Ojibwa Boy’s Death Helped Break the Silence on Child Abuse (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1997). 
53. Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, supra note 3 at 487.
54. Aboriginal organizations have called for inquiries and action to deal with violence against 
women, particularly in relation to murdered and missing Aboriginal women. See Native 
Women’s Association of Canada, “Collaboration to End Violence: National Aboriginal 
Women’s Forum” (27 July 2011), online: <http://www.nwac.ca/sites/default/fi les/imce/
BC%20MARR%20Reports%20Compiled%20July%2027%202011%20w%20Dig.pdf>.
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havens of gender sensitivity when it comes to addressing violence against women.55 
Signifi cant problems remain56 despite encouraging signs of change related to this 
issue within Indigenous communities.57 
From many vantage points, therefore, the troubling levels of violence within 
Indigenous communities might be considered a reason for denying jurisdiction 
to Indigenous peoples.58 People will reasonably wonder whether societies with 
this degree of trauma are capable of dealing with violence against women. Th ese 
essential questions must be addressed squarely. To be certain, safety must be a 
paramount concern in addressing violence against women.59 Reserves can be 
dangerous places at times, and jurisdictional and other reforms should acknowl-
edge and work in light of this fact.60 At the same time we must not lose sight 
of the strength, creativity, and resilience of Indigenous women and their allies 
on the reserves and beyond; their knowledge and experience is a key source of 
power in addressing violence at many levels.61 It must be recognized that there 
are many places within Indigenous communities where people enjoy safe and 
healthy lives.62 We should take care to avoid painting all Indigenous peoples 
55. Emma LaRocque, “Violence in Aboriginal Communities” in Katherine MJ McKenna & June 
Larkin, eds, Violence Against Women: New Canadian Perspectives (Toronto: Inanna, 2002) at 147.
56. Douglas A Brownridge, “Understanding the Elevated Risk of Partner Violence Against 
Aboriginal Women: A Comparison of Two Nationally Representative Surveys of Canada” 
(2008) 23 J Fam Violence 353; “Male Partner Violence against Aboriginal Women in 
Canada: An Empirical Analysis” (2003) 18:1 J Interpersonal Violence 65.
57. Wayne Warry, Unfi nished dreams: community healing and the reality of aboriginal self-
government (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) at 160-62.
58. For example, in past constitutional debates the concerns of Aboriginal women were not 
adequately taken into account. See Joyce Green, “Constitutionalizing the Patriarchy: 
Aboriginal Women and Aboriginal Government” (1992) 4:1 Const Forum 110.
59. Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992) at 155-74.
60. A tragically poignant example of the failure to recognize this fact is recorded in Jane Doe v 
Awasis Agency of Northern Manitoba (1990), 67 Man R (2d) 260, 72 DLR (4th) 738 (CA).
61. Th ose who have experienced violence usually have a good of idea of which actions are 
eff ective and which are not in this fi eld. See, more generally, Francine Pickup, Suzanne 
Williams & Caroline Sweetman, Ending Violence Against Women: A Challenge for Development 
and Humanitarian Work (Oxford: Oxfam, 2001).
62. Boyce Richardson, ed, Drum Beat: anger and renewal in Indian country (Ottawa: 
Summerhill Press, 1989) at 137-66; Leanne Simpson, Dancing on Our Turtle’s Back: Stories 
of Nishnaabeg Re-Creation, Resurgence, and a New Emergence (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring, 
2011). For a discussion of how Aboriginal communities actually contribute positively to 
Canadian society, see Cora Voyageur, David Newhouse & Daniel Beavon, eds, Hidden in 
Plain Sight: contributions of Aboriginal peoples to Canadian identity and culture (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005).
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with the same brush.63 Trauma, while widespread, is not the norm in every 
place throughout Aboriginal Canada.64 Furthermore, we should also reject the 
assumption that communities experiencing deep levels of violence are incapable 
of dealing with this issue, given the proper resources and legal tools.65 People are 
able to change their lives amidst the most trying conditions.66 While addressing 
violence is certainly more challenging in such contexts, and requires a signifi cant 
level of support as noted above, much can be accomplished.67 Th us, while we 
should always be deeply concerned about any (Indigenous or non-Indigenous) 
community’s ability to eff ectively address violence against women, these issues 
should always be considered in a more nuanced light.   
Secondly, it must be acknowledged that Canadian governments  have 
not responded eff ectively to the nationwide crisis involving violence against 
Indigenous women.68 In fact, even as women’s organizations across Canada have 
been advocating for additional attention to, and services for, addressing violence 
against women (among other matters), they have suff ered across-the-board cuts 
to their public funding.69 Furthermore, repeated calls by national Aboriginal 
63. Some communities have taken positive steps to address violence against women. See Jarem 
Sawatsky, Th e ethic of traditional communities and the spirit of healing justice: studies from 
Hollow Water, the Iona Community, and Plum Village (London, UK: Jessica Kingsley, 2009). 
Furthermore, the complexities of membership in multiple communities must be considered 
in dealing with violence against Aboriginal women. See Rauna Kuokkanen, “Intersectionality 
and Violence against Indigenous Women” (2013) CJWL [forthcoming]. 
64. I have addressed this issue in John Borrows, “Seven Generations, Seven Teachings: Ending 
the Indian Act” National Centre for First Nations Governance, online: <http://fngovernance.
org/resources_docs/7_Generations_7_Teachings.pdf>. 
65. For a discussion of the ability of traumatized communities to positively respond amidst 
violence, see Jack Rothman et al, eds, Strategies of Community Intervention: Macro 
Practice, 5th ed (Itasca, IL: FE Peacock, 1995); Jack Rothman, ed, Refl ections on Community 
Organization: Enduring Th emes and Critical Issues (Itasca, IL: FE Peacock, 1999); Barbara 
Levy Simon, Th e Empowerment Tradition in American Social Work: A History (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994).
66. See generally Monica McGoldrick, ed, Re-Visioning Family Th erapy: Race, Culture and Gender 
in Clinical Practice (New York: Guilford Press, 1998).
67. For examples and a discussion of this issue, see Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: 
An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999); Gerald R Alfred, Heeding 
the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995); Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of 
Action and Freedom (Toronto: Broadview Press, 2005).
68. Rupert Ross, “Traumatization in Remote First Nations: An Expression of Concern” (2006) 
[unpublished, on fi le with author].
69. For a list of Women’s and Indigenous organizations that have had their funding cut by 
the federal government in recent years see Gina Starblanket, Beyond Culture in the Courts: 
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organizations for the Canadian government to address violence against Indig-
enous women have been met with responses that do not confront the problem’s 
systemic nature.70 Th e same situation largely prevails within the provinces, where 
governments have not taken the initiative to address violence against Indigenous 
women structurally. In fact, even in those rare cases in which provinces have 
acted, their processes have been framed in excessively narrow terms. For example, 
commissions of inquiry have been established to examine select issues related 
to violence against Indigenous women in British Columbia71 and Manitoba,72 
but the governments’ limited focus has generally failed to generate support from 
the most aff ected Indigenous communities.73 Moreover, the existence of Charter 
rights protecting, inter alia, life, liberty, security, and equality has had little infl u-
ence in addressing this issue.74 Broader structural change is needed but has not 
been forthcoming.75 Th e failure of federal and provincial governments to deal 
Re-inspiring Approaches to Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canadian Jurisprudence (MA 
Th esis, University of Victoria, Department of Political Science, 2012) [unpublished] at 
89-90, online: <http://dspace.library.uvic.ca:8080/bitstream/handle/1828/3914/Gina%20
Starblanket%20UVic%20MA%20Th esis%20DSpace.pdf?sequence=3>.
70. See Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada, “National Strategy to Prevent Abuse in Inuit 
Communities” (Ottawa: Pauktuutit Inuit Women of Canada, 2006), online: Inuit Women of 
Canada <www.pauktuutit.ca>. 
71. British Columbia, Missing Women Commission of Inquiry, Forsaken: Th e Report of the 
Missing Women Commission of Inquiry: Executive Summary (British Columbia: Th e Inquiry, 
2012), online: <www.missingwomeninquiry.ca>.
72. Manitoba has created an Integrated Task Force for Murdered and Missing Women as a joint 
eff ort between the government of Manitoba, the RCMP, and the Winnipeg Police Services. 
See Government of Manitoba, News Release, “Integrated Task Force Formed – Cases of 
Missing and Murdered Women to be Subject of Enhanced Scrutiny” (26 August 2009), 
online: <http://news.gov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=6621>.
73. Jennifer Koshan, “Aboriginal Women, Justice and the Charter: Bridging the Divide?” (1998) 
32:1 UBC L Rev 23 at 1. 
74. Diane Majury, “Th e Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and Celebration” 
(2002) 40:3 Osgoode Hall LJ 297 at 320. Majury observes: “Violence against women is 
probably the area in which section 15 has been most frequently argued before the Supreme 
Court of Canada.” Despite this attention, Aboriginal women, as Aboriginals and women, 
have not received sustained attention from the courts under the Charter.  
75. “[T]he root causes and major sites of violence against Aboriginal women have been theorized 
too narrowly, and solutions proposed and implemented … have not been responsive to 
the needs of Aboriginal women.” Jennifer Koshan, “Sounds of Silence: Th e Public/Private 
Dichotomy, Violence and Aboriginal Women” in Susan Boyd, ed, Challenging the Public/
Private Divide: Feminism, Law, and Public Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1997) at 88-89. For a broader analysis of Canada’s failure to address issues facing Aboriginal 
women, see Mary Ellen Turpel, “Patriarchy and Paternalism: Th e Legacy of the Canadian 
State for First Nations Women” (1993) 6:1 CJWL 174.
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meaningfully with violence against Indigenous women shows that the status quo 
is not working.76 Any even-handed assessment of Indigenous jurisdiction related 
to violence against women must take account of this fact.      
Th irdly, in considering Indigenous jurisdiction in relation to violence against 
women, it should be acknowledged that Aboriginal governance rights exercised 
under section 35(1) would not be exclusive. For example, Canadian govern-
ments can justify infringements of section 35(1) rights if the Crown’s actions 
are honourable and in accordance with valid objectives.77 Th us, if Indigenous 
governance powers in relation to violence against women were recognized and 
deployed, the Canadian government could always aid or modify this exercise 
through consultation and accommodation in accordance with its other obligations 
under section 35(1).78 Nevertheless, this shared framework would not give the 
Crown an unfettered license to impose unjustifi able burdens on Indigenous 
actions addressing violence against women. Section 35(1) constrains Crown 
sovereignty by serving as a check against arbitrary government action. As the 
SCC observed in Sparrow, section 35(1) “gives a measure of control over government 
conduct and a strong check on legislative power.”79 Th e fact that Indigenous 
sovereignty limits that of the Crown when section 35(1) is at issue should be 
more explicitly conceded. Th is is one of the most signifi cant implications of the 
constitutional requirement that infringements of Aboriginal and treaty rights be 
justifi ed by valid governmental objectives, which are pursued honourably and in 
good faith.80 In this light, Indigenous governance would be regarded as functioning 
analogously to the checks and balances of federalism—that is, working in a 
cooperative, coordinated way with the other levels of government. Th is means 
that Crown sovereignty should appropriately constrain Indigenous sovereignty, 
and vice versa, in dealing with the practical jurisdictional questions concerning 
violence against women.81 Such an approach would enhance Indigenous governance 
76. See also Sherene H Razack, “Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: Th e Murder 
of Pamela George” (2000) 15:2 CJLS 91.
77. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 64. 
78. John Borrows, “Let Obligations Be Done” in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven & Jeremy 
Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2007) at 130.
79. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 65.
80. Governments in Canada do not function as watertight compartments within Canada’s 
constitutional scheme. See AG Canada v AG Ontario (Th e Labour Conventions Case), [1937] 
AC 326 at 354, [1937] 1 DLR 673.
81. If the Constitution does not equalize the Crown’s power to infringe Indigenous jurisdiction 
with Indigenous peoples’ power to infringe Crown jurisdiction in a coordinated, harmonized 
manner then critiques regarding the unilateral, coercive nature of Crown sovereignty made 
by the following scholars could be further strengthened. See, Gordon Christie, “Judicial 
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as well as Canadian responses to ensure that violence against women is dealt with 
in ways that draw upon the strengths of all jurisdictions across the land.82
Furthermore, it should be noted that Indigenous peoples’ governmental 
responsibilities regarding Indigenous women under section 35(1) would also be 
subject to section 35(4), which states: “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed 
equally to male and female persons.”83 Th is provision is an important bulwark 
against innovations that could otherwise undermine Indigenous women’s rights. 
It must be remembered that this section would likely have its greatest impact on 
political discourse and practices; it would only take one or two cases under 
section 35(4) to generate a political discourse more explicitly attentive to section 
35(1)’s gender equality implications. Th is increased emphasis on gender equality would 
reinforce the idea that distinctions adversely impacting Indigenous women could 
not be sustained under section 35(1) as they would run contrary to section 
35(4)’s protections.84 Th us, every time an Indigenous community exercised its 
governance jurisdiction under the Constitution, including matters related to 
Indigenous women, such authority would be subject to an overriding constraint 
protecting gender equality found in section 35(4).85 While not completely 
Justifi cation of a Recent Development in Aboriginal Law?” (2002) 17:2 CJLS 41; Kent 
McNeil, “Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and Judicial 
Discretion” (2001-2002) 33:2 Ottawa L Rev 301; Ardith Walkem & Halie Bruce, eds, Box of 
Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton: Th eytus Books, 2003).
82. Th e dominant judicial approach to Indigenous governance in Canada regards jurisdiction as 
being exercised through overlapping spheres. See Starr v Houlden, [1990] 1 SCR 1366, 68 
DLR (4th) 641. Indigenous governance under s 35(1) should be treated as also operating in 
ways that overlap with federal and provincial governments.
83. Constitution Act, supra note 18, s 35(4). For a discussion of s 35(4)’s place in the Constitution, 
see Dancing Around the Table, Part 1 and Part 2 (Ottawa: National Film Board, 1987), 
online: <http://www.nfb.ca/fi lm/dancing_around_the_table_1/>. 
84. In applying s 35(4), it must be recognized that equality does not always mean identical 
treatment. Th us, s 35(4) would allow diff erential treatment in gender relations if such 
distinctions did not constitute adverse discrimination. Th is could permit healthy gendered 
traditions within Indigenous communities and these would be reinforced by s 25 of the 
Charter, which prevents important collective rights from being eroded. As Justice Iacobucci 
observed: “[T]rue equality does not necessarily result from identical treatment.” See Law v 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 25, 170 DLR 
(4th) 1. 
85. Some of the contours of s 35(4) could be drawn from Indigenous feminist scholarship. In 
Sparrow, the Court wrote: “While it is impossible to give an easy defi nition of … rights, 
it is possible, and, indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the 
meaning of the rights at stake.” Supra note 45 at para 69. For some examples of Aboriginal 
women’s perspectives related to Aboriginal rights, see Joyce Green, ed, Making Space for 
(2013) 50 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL716
addressing the complex extra-legal factors involved in violence against women, 
section 35(4)’s protection could go some distance towards addressing the problem 
of male domination within some Indigenous communities and leadership circles. 
It could also be a signifi cant political tool for addressing violence against women 
long before courts or legislatures get around to recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction 
relating to this issue.
In fact, diffi  culties related to gendered violence within Indigenous communities 
are likely to remain problematic until they are subject to the full legal and political 
force of section 35(4). Section 35(4) would play a greater role in Canada’s 
Constitution if Aboriginal people exercised jurisdiction related to violence against 
women under section 35(1) and Aboriginal political actors placed this principle 
at the heart of their advocacy. When Indigenous peoples exercise their power 
to make political decisions under section 35(1), the fuller promise of section 
35(4) should become more apparent. It will operate to expand the protections 
of Aboriginal women within their communities whenever women’s rights are 
in question. Under this reading of section 35(4), there would be no possibility 
of Indigenous communities using their authority to engage in any traditional, 
customary, or other practice or law that subordinates women and subjects them 
to any form of adverse discrimination.86 Section 35(4) could therefore have 
considerable remedial eff ect, internally as well as externally, as Indigenous peoples 
exercise greater authority under section 35(1). Th is could further alleviate concerns 
fl owing from having Indigenous communities deal with violence against women 
while still being deeply mired in discrimination in too many quarters.  
Finally, experience in the United States suggests that recognizing Indigenous 
jurisdiction over violence against women at least partially counteracts aspects of 
gendered discrimination within Indigenous communities. In pointing this out, 
I am not suggesting that the United States should be the model for dealing with 
violence against women in Canada. In fact, distinctive and signifi cant challenges 
Indigenous Feminism (Halifax: Fernwood, 2007); Bonita Lawrence & Kim Anderson, Strong 
Women Stories: Native Vision and Community Survival (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2003).
86. Formal distinctions in treatment will sometimes be necessary to accommodate diff erences 
between individuals and to thereby produce equal treatment in a substantive sense. For the 
leading Canadian case, see Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143, 
56 DLR (4th) 1. See also Minority Schools in Albania (1935), PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 64 at 17; 
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 6 at 
248. For an excellent discussion of Indigenous women and international human rights see 
Rebecca Tsosie, “Indigenous Women and International Human Rights Law: Th e Challenges 
of Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and Self-Determination” (2010) 15:1 UCLA J Int’l L & 
Foreign Aff  187.
BORROWS, ABORIGINAL & TREATY RIGHTS 717
concerning violence against Indigenous women are present in the United States,87 
as is the case with women in most societies throughout the world to greater 
and lesser degrees.88 Th is comparative experience is only invoked to illustrate the 
point that signifi cant political mobilization can occur when Indigenous governments 
take responsibility over this area. When the locus of political authority for dealing 
with violence against women rests with Indigenous governments, they face much 
greater internal and external pressure to take action in this fi eld.89 
On the internal side of the equation, chiefs and councils fi nd that their electoral 
prospects are tied to their eff ectiveness in addressing this issue.90 If they do not 
take action on this front, their own constituents on the reservations demand that 
they do so. When Indigenous communities exercise meaningful self-determination, 
blame cannot be shifted as easily to other levels of government when faced with 
such demands. Th erefore, if leaders do not listen to these voices, their chances 
of political success fade in some circumstances. While violence against women 
is not the only issue competing for attention on Indigenous legislative agendas, 
it has a high enough profile to be politically salient and generate extensive 
legislation. An Indigenous leader who ignores this issue for an extended period 
of time loses an important base of electoral support within his or her community. 
If a candidate faces political uncertainty, the failure to take account of this issue 
could be a swing factor in their electoral prospects. Th e internal incentives 
created by the leadership and advocacy of many Indigenous women chiefs, leaders, 
and organizations should not be overlooked when considering Indigenous 
jurisdiction in this fi eld. 
As a result of these and other incentives, Native governments in the United 
States have acted in signifi cant ways to legislate in this fi eld.91 A brief review of 
tribal statutes demonstrates this fact. When Indigenous governments deal with 
general issues related to violence against women outside the context of domestic 
87. Kathie Dobie, “Tiny Little Laws: A Plague of Sexual Violence in Indian Country,” Harper’s 
Magazine (February 2011) 55, online <http://harpers.org/archive/2011/02/tiny-little-laws/>.
88. Michael Penn & Rachel Nardos, Overcoming Violence Against Women and Girls: Th e 
International Campaign to Eradicate a Worldwide Problem (Lanham, MD: Rowan Littlefi eld, 
2003) at 1-13.
89. Some of this pressure is intensifi ed by the inadequacy of federal law in this fi eld. See Kevin 
Washburn, “American Indians, Crime and the Law” (2006) 104:4 Mich L Rev 709 at 738.
90. For a discussion of the politics of violence against women, see Jacqui True, Th e Political 
Economy of Violence against Women (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
91. United States, Tribal Law and Policy Institute, Tribal Legal Code Resource: Domestic Violence 
Laws Guide for Drafting or Revising Victim-Centered Tribal Laws Against Domestic Violence 
by (West Hollywood: Th e Institute, 2012) (Sarah Deer et al), online: <http://www.tribal-
institute.org/download/Amended%20Domestic_Violence_Code_Resource_2012.pdf >.
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violence, “it is not common to have a separate law on sexual assault jurisdiction 
that diff ers from general criminal jurisdiction.”92 Thus, while some tribal 
governments have specifi c provisions addressing sexual assault,93 most have all-
purpose criminal codes invoking jurisdiction over violent crimes on a broader 
level.94 Furthermore, most tribes also take general jurisdiction over this issue 
through civil statutes.95 However, there is one special area of legislative activity 
that deals specifi cally with violence against women on reserves: domestic violence 
codes.96 In addition to their considerable detail, these ordinances often contain 
important contextual statements outlining their purposes. In this way they set 
the tone for discussion and action related to violence against women within 
Native American communities. For example, the Fort Mohave Law and Order 
Code expresses faith in the importance of law in reducing and deterring domestic 
violence.97 Th e Hopi Family Relations Ordinance identifi es the scope and tragic 
92. United States, Tribal Law and Policy Institute, A Victim-Centered Approach to Sexual Violence 
and Stalking Against Native Women: Resource Guide for Drafting or Revising Tribal Criminal 
Laws Against Sexual Assault and Stalking, (West Hollywood, Cal: Th e Institute, 2012) (Sarah 
Deer & Maureen L White Eagle) at 29.
93. See Hannahville Indian Community Criminal Sexual Conduct Code, § 1.2084; Nez Perce Tribal 
Code, § 4-1-48; Little Traverse Bay Band of Odawa Indians, § 4; Blackfeet Tribal Law, c 5, § 9; 
Skokomish Tribal Code, § 9.02A.020; Fort Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice, c 2(C), § 224.
94. For examples of provisions outlining concurrent criminal law jurisdiction with the federal 
government, see White Mountain Apache Criminal Code, § 1.2; White Earth Band of 
Chippewa Judicial Code title 1, c 2, § 1.
95. See Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community Domestic Violence Code, art I, § B; Sault Ste 
Marie Tribal Code, § 34.102; Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians Domestic Violence 
Code, § 5000; Ninilchik Village Ordinance No 99-01, § 3.
96. For examples of domestic violence provisions, see Makah Tribal Law and Order Code, title 
11, c 1, § 11.1.04; Colville Law and Order Code, c 5-5; Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians 
Domestic and Family Violence Ordinance, § 12.505; Kickapoo Tribe in Kansas Domestic 
Violence Code, §§ 205(3), (7); Saginaw Chippewa Domestic Abuse Protection Code, c 1.241. 
For examples of tribal court procedures, see Oglala Sioux Tribal Code, § 218; Oglala Sioux 
Tribe Domestic Violence Code, § 99.2, c 1, § 214; Yakama Nation Domestic Violence Code, c 
2, § 2.8. For examples of sanctions and victims’ rights, see Sault Ste Marie Tribal Code, § 75.103; 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, c 5, § 3; White Mountain Apache, c 6, § 6.3; Makah Tribal Code, 
§ 11.4.09(h); Saginaw Chippewa Domestic Abuse Protection Code, § 1.2404; Omaha Tribe of 
Nebraska, Domestic Violence Code, § 3.08; Muscogee (Creek) Nation Code, Domestic and Family 
Violence, c 4, §3-401. For examples of protection orders, see Hopi Family Relations Ordinance, c 
2, § 6.01; Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, § 1; Nez Perce Tribal Code, c 7, § 7-3-4; 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, tit 6, § 3-407(c); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Tribal Code, § 12.504; 
Ninilchik Village Ordinance No. 99-01, § 11; Oglala Sioux Tribe, § 315; Turtle Mountain Band 
of Chippewa Indians, Domestic Violence, § 3060. For examples of prevention and intervention 
programs, see Oglala Sioux Tribe Domestic Violence Code, c 5, §506.
97.  Fort Mojave Indian Reservation Law and Order Code, art XIII, c A § 1301. 
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consequences of domestic violence for individuals, clans, and communities while 
making specifi c mention of the fact that domestic violence is not just a “family” 
matter.98 Th e Domestic Abuse of the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Code contains strong 
statements criticizing the tribe’s past approaches to domestic violence,99 while the 
Oglala Sioux Domestic Violence Code contains a bold declaration of purpose that 
underlines the cultural inappropriateness of violence against women as well as 
the importance of safety, protection, prosecution, and education in dealing with 
this issue.100 Th ese detailed statutes, along with tribal court cases that interpret 
them, are evidence of the pressure tribes face within their communities to deal 
eff ectively with domestic violence.101 Th ough progress is slow in overcoming this 
scourge, they demonstrate that even communities facing high levels of trauma are 
capable of developing a response to this crisis. Again, these examples are raised to 
demonstrate the political implications of Indigenous jurisdiction.
Tribes in the United States also encounter external pressures to address gendered 
discrimination as a result of their authority related to violence against women. 
People outside the tribe organize themselves to persuade tribal councils to act 
more constructively in this fi eld. Externally generated pressure not only comes 
from academics and policy institutes, but also from women’s organizations,102 
tribal, state, and local governments,103 as well as international bodies.104 Moreover, 
when tribes exercise jurisdiction, the US federal government is ironically more 
active than its Canadian counterpart in the fi eld of violence against women on 
reserves, even as it acts sensitively to recognize Indigenous self-determination in 
this fi eld.105 Sustained legislative dialogues are developing between the federal and 
Indigenous governments as violence against women is recognized as an important 
98. Hopi Family Relations Ordinance, c 1, § 3.01.
99. Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, title VII, §§ 1, 5-10.       
100. Oglala Sioux Tribe Domestic Violence Code, title 99.2, c 1, § 101.
101. Donna Coker, “Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo 
Peacemaking” (1999) 47:1 UCLA L Rev 1.
102. See e.g. Collaboration to End Violence: National Aboriginal 
Women’s Forum 2011, online: <http://www.nwac.ca/research/
collaboration-end-violence-national-aboriginal-womens-forum-2011>.
103. Offi  ce of Violence Against Women, Tribal Communities, (Washington DC: Th e United 
States Department of Justice, 2013), online: <www.ovw.usdoj.gov/tribal.html> [Tribal 
Communities].
104. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 
December 1979, Can TS 1982 No 31. See also Declaration on the Elimination 
of Violence Against Women, GA Res 48/104, UNGAOR, 48 Sess, UN Doc/A/Res/48/104 
(1993).
105. Tribal Communities, supra note 103.
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fi eld of law-making activity within US First Nations communities.106 Th is 
dialogue is leading to further innovation at the tribal level and spawning action 
at the federal level to create frameworks to address this issue.  
For example, tribes have worked with the federal government in the United 
States to recognize more fully inherent tribal jurisdiction to deal with violence 
against women and the need to provide resources and assistance in this regard.107 
If such power were recognized in Canada, the federal government could likewise 
consider legislation similar to statutes passed in the United States Congress. Th e 
Stand Against Violence and Empower Native Women Act (SAVE Native Women 
Act), which was proposed as a stand-alone piece of legislation but has since become 
Title IX of the Violence Against Women Act, was designed to allow tribes to make 
fuller use of their own laws to address violence against women on reserves and 
is an example of the type of action that governments could take to support 
Indigenous communities.108 Since tribes in the United States clearly have 
jurisdiction over their own members in this sphere,109 the Act acknowledges that 
tribes possess jurisdiction over non-Indians110 who commit violent crimes against 
106. United States, Tribal Justice and Safety, Indian Country Accomplishments of the Department of 
Justice, (Washington: Department of Justice, 2013), online: Th e United States Department of 
Justice <www.justice.gov/tribal/accomplishments.html>.
107. Th e failure to recognize and harmonize Indigenous jurisdiction with state and federal 
jurisdiction is one of the most serious challenges in dealing with violence against Indigenous 
women. See Sumayyah Waheed, “Domestic Violence on the Reservation: Imperfect Laws, 
Imperfect Solution” (2004) 19:1 Berkeley Women’s LJ 287.
108. Th e SAVE Native Women Act was designed to “decrease the incidence of violent crimes 
against Indian women, to strengthen the capacity of Indian tribes to exercise the sovereign 
authority of Indian tribes to respond to violent crimes committed against Indian women, 
and to ensure that perpetrators of violent crimes committed against Indian women are 
held accountable for that criminal behavior, and for other purposes.” It was incorporated 
into the Violence Against Women Act upon reauthorization this year. Violence Against Women 
Reauthorization Act, USC 42 tit 9 § 901 (2013) amending 42 USC § 13925 (1994) [Title IX].
109. See Virginia H Murray, “A Comparative Study of the Historic Civil, Common and American 
Indian Tribal Law Responses to Domestic Violence” (1998) 23 Okla City UL Rev 433. 
Professor Sarah Deer has also written extensively on the issue of tribal law in relation to 
violence against women. See “Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native Feminist Synthesis of Safety 
and Sovereignty” (2009) 24:2 Wicazo SA Rev 149; Carrie A Martell & Sarah Deer, “Heeding 
the Voice of Native Women: Toward an Ethic of Decolonization” (2005) 81:4 NDL Rev 807; 
Sarah Deer, “Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and 
Federal Indian Law” (2005) 38:2 Suff olk UL Rev 455; “Expanding the Network of Safety: 
Tribal Protection Orders for Survivors of Sexual Assault” (2004) 4:3 Tribal Law Journal; 
“Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape” (2004) 14:1 Kan JL and Pub Pol’y 121.
110. Title IX, supra note 108, s 904. Th is provision is designed to redress the US Supreme Court’s 
conclusions that tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction over non-Indians were limited. See 
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women on Indian lands.111 At the same time, it recognizes that signifi cant problems 
exist for Indigenous women off -reserve. Th us, Title IX seeks to improve Native 
programs under the Violence Against Women Act112 by enhancing data gathering 
programs throughout the United States to better understand and respond to the 
sex traffi  cking of Native women.113
 It would be a groundbreaking development if section 35(1) were to 
recognize that self-governing communities in Canada possess similar jurisdic-
tional tools. Th is recognition would also be important in light of the fact that 
much of the violence faced by Indigenous women occurs off  reserves.114 In such 
circumstances, Indigenous peoples might work with the federal government to 
gather the type of data required under Title IX, which would bring resources 
and attention to bear on issues arising from the over 580 missing and murdered 
Indigenous women in Canada. Th is would make it easier to respond to the national 
dimension of Canada’s current crisis because action would be taken on a government-
to-government basis. Th ere is also great value in the Act’s recognition of the breadth 
and scope of the problem involving violence against women.115 Acknowledgement of 
harm is an essential step towards moving beyond it.116 When the SAVE Native 
Women Act was introduced, its sponsor, Senator Akaka, said: 
According to a study by the Department of Justice, two-in-fi ve women in Native 
communities will suff er domestic violence, and one-in-three will be sexually assaulted 
in their lifetime. Furthermore, four out of fi ve perpetrators of these crimes are non-
Indian, and cannot be prosecuted by tribal governments. Th is has contributed to a 
growing sense of lawlessness on Indian reservations and a perpetuation of victimization 
of Native women.117 
respectively, Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe et al, 435 US 191 at 196, 98 S Ct 1011 
(1978); Montana et al v United States, 450 US 544 at 564, 101 S Ct 1245 (1981); Nevada v 
Hicks, 533 US 353 at 359-60, 121 S Ct 2304 (2001). 
111. Title IX, supra note 108, s 904, amending Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 USC § 1301-
1303. For further analysis of the problem of non-Indians and violence against women, 
see Amy Radon, “Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: Th e Need for Non-Indian 
Accountability on the Reservation” (2004) 37:4 U Mich JL Ref 1275.
112. Violence Against Women Act, 42 USC § 13925 (1994).
113. Title IX, supra note 108, s 907. See also Sarah Deer, “Relocation Revisited: Sex Traffi  cking of 
Native Women in the United States” (2010) 36:2 Wm Mitchell L Rev 621.
114. What Th eir Stories Tell Us, supra note 15. 
115. Herman, supra note 59 at 175-94.
116. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) at 121. However, for a critique of the potential 
hollowness of acknowledgment without action, see Lee Taft, “Apology Subverted: Th e 
Commodifi cation of Apology” (2000) 109:5 Yale LJ 1135 at 1158-59.
117. Daniel K Akaka, Chairman Akaka introduces the SAVE Native Women Act (YouTube, at 1:00), 
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Th us, while the legal context of the two countries is somewhat diff erent, the 
socio-cultural conditions between them are not greatly dissimilar when it comes 
to Indigenous issues. In this light, Title IX is an important example of how 
Indigenous groups could work with governments to address domestic violence 
while enhancing community self-determination.118
II. SECTION 35(1) AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
Having discussed reasons why Indigenous communities should not be excluded 
from exercising jurisdiction related to violence against women, I turn now to the 
essential question of how this issue could be framed within section 35(1) jurispru-
dence. As noted, violence against women will only receive the political attention 
it deserves if Indigenous and Canadian governments treat it as a constitutional 
issue while continuing to address its other dimensions (social dislocation, 
poverty, colonialism, male domination on- and off -reserve, defi cient fi scal policy, 
et cetera). In raising this issue’s importance in the constitutional realm, Indigenous 
peoples would have at least two options for asserting jurisdiction over violence 
against women: Th ey could bring a claim as either an Aboriginal right or a treaty 
right. Unfortunately, given the narrow way in which the SCC currently frames 
both of these rights, it is unlikely that a community would succeed under the 
dominant interpretations of section 35(1). Th is conclusion may be viewed as a 
reason for abandoning the Constitution’s Aboriginal provisions when dealing with 
violence against women. 
Th ere is no question that section 35(1) has largely become a dead end in 
challenging Canada’s continued colonial practices, particularly beyond cases that 
involve the allocation of resources between the Crown and First Nations. Despite 
its current weaknesses, however, I believe that there are at least two crucial 
reasons for claiming jurisdiction related to violence against women under section 
35(1). First, an application of the prevailing tests in section 35(1) jurisprudence 
highlights fatal constitutional defects in present interpretive approaches. Second, 
a discussion of section 35(1)’s interpretive fl aws exposes latent alternative readings 
that can be used to build a healthier jurisprudence. To be sure, it must be continually 
emphasized that action in the fi eld of violence against women must always be 
broader than constitutional argument.119 However, it is also important that 
online: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VrXzcXynOd0>.
118. Title IX, supra note 108.
119. I have written elsewhere about the grassroots development of Indigenous institutions, 
norms, and legal traditions. See, John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide (Toronto: 
BORROWS, ABORIGINAL & TREATY RIGHTS 723
constitutional avenues not be abandoned, because Indigenous women deserve 
and require protection at the highest levels of constitutional law as well as within 
the mundane details of everyday community life. 
Th us, in considering Aboriginal peoples’ claims to section 35(1) rights in 
relation to violence against women, the SCC’s current tests in the fi eld of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights will be outlined to reveal their critical defects. After 
reviewing the Court’s dominant tests in each area, alternative arguments within 
the existing jurisprudence will be canvassed to demonstrate how current laws 
could be interpreted to protect against violence and enhance Indigenous self-
determination in this important fi eld.
A. ABORIGINAL RIGHTS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THE 
“INTEGRAL TO THE DISTINCTIVE CULTURE” TEST
Under the Court’s current approach to establishing Aboriginal rights (other than 
Aboriginal title)120 within section 35(1), Indian, Métis, or Inuit groups must 
demonstrate that a practice, custom, or tradition was “integral to their distinctive 
culture” prior to European contact.121 Applying this test to a claim of Indigenous 
jurisdiction in relation to violence against women, a court would insist on 
precision in relation to the claim’s exact nature.122 Th is means that the potential 
right must be framed as narrowly as possible in the fi rst instance without an 
excessive level of generality and it “must be looked at in light of the specifi c 
circumstances of each case, and in light of the specifi c history and culture of the 
Indigenous group claiming the right.”123 As noted above in Part I, Pamajewon 
held that Aboriginal people could not claim “broad management rights over 
reserve lands.”124 As a result of this specifi city requirement, a community may 
not be able to claim jurisdiction “for any and all purposes”125 related to domestic 
University of Toronto Press, 2010); Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010).
120. Th e distinction between Aboriginal rights and title was fi rst identifi ed in R v Adams, [1996] 3 
SCR 101 at para 26, 138 DLR (4th) 657. Th e test for Aboriginal title was fi rst articulated in 
Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at para 143.
121. Van der Peet, supra note 24. 
122. Ibid at para 53; Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 25; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v Canada 
(Attorney General), 2011 SCC 56 at para 46, 338 DLR (4th) 193 [Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band].
123. Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 27. For a discussion of this principle in relation to 
Aboriginal governance, see John Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal Governance as 
an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 285.
124. Pamajewon, supra note 25 at para 27. 
125. For a discussion of the precise identifi cation of practices upon which rights can be claimed, 
see Sappier, supra note 24 at paras 20-24. 
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violence. Th us, under the dominant approach, the courts may insist that a group 
plead the smallest increments of jurisdiction, such as the prevention of violence 
or the punishment of people who were violent towards Indigenous women.126 
Once a court has identifi ed the correct (narrow) characterization of the claim, 
it would require detailed evidence that violence against women, its prevention, 
or the punishment of people who engage in it were “integral to the distinctive 
culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.”127 
At this point, the test gets exceedingly messy for any Indigenous group 
claiming domestic violence jurisdiction. For example, for an Indigenous group 
to succeed, it would have to demonstrate that violence against women and 
proactive responses to it were vital to the means by which it sustained itself prior 
to European contact.128 It would have to show that its society would have been 
“fundamentally altered” if such abuse did not occur and if the community did 
not prevent or punish those responsible.129 Additionally, it would need to introduce 
detailed proof of such facts in support of its claim, because a signifi cant number 
of Aboriginal rights cases have not succeeded due to fi ndings that insuffi  cient 
evidence was presented at each stage of the test.130 
Th e spectacle of such a case about violence against women and the evidence 
it would highlight is diffi  cult to imagine. First, a group would likely have to 
produce both oral and written history demonstrating the structural nature of 
violence against women in traditional Aboriginal society prior to European contact 
and the society’s responses to this violence. Th us, lawyers would have to introduce 
gruesome and widespread examples of pre-contact violence towards women along 
with proactive (preventative or punitive) responses in order to show its “centrality” 
to the community. To further complicate proof of jurisdiction, a community 
would next have to establish a “reasonable degree of continuity” of violence and 
response from contact to the present day, and demonstrate that modern practices 
of violence towards women, and responses to it, have essential similarities to past 
126. Th e characterization of Aboriginal rights often seems to be out of the hands of Aboriginal 
people as courts routinely recharacterize claims in order to suit their view of the issue. For a 
historian’s perspective on this process, see Arthur Ray, Telling It to the Judge: Taking Native 
History to Court (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011).
127. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 46.
128. Ibid at para 4; Sappier, supra note 24 at para 38.
129. Sappier, ibid at para 39. 
130. Aboriginal claims which failed due to lack of precise evidence include Van der Peet, supra note 
24; Delgamuukw, supra note 24; Mitchell, supra note 27; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, supra 
note 122.
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violence.131 An Indigenous group claiming this right would thus fi nd itself spending 
millions of dollars on experts and legal fees to shame itself before the courts with 
such evidence.132  
It is diffi  cult to contemplate the prospect that any Indigenous group would 
be willing to sustain such an inquiry due to the stereotypes it could evoke in 
the public consciousness. Images of Indigenous men living in the pre-contact 
forests of North America marginalizing, sexually assaulting, beating, and killing 
Indigenous women would be diffi  cult for any community to highlight, even if 
their purpose was to focus on remedial practices. Furthermore, even if a group 
surprisingly decided to expose themselves to this process and managed to escape 
the media circus such evidence would raise, they would still be faced with the 
next-to-impossible task of demonstrating that such activities, and proactive or 
defensive responses to them, made their society what it was.133 Not to put too 
fi ne of a point on this process, but it seems both racist and sexist in the extreme 
to require Indigenous peoples to subject themselves to this spectacle in order 
to prove that they have inherent constitutional power to prevent and sanction 
members of their communities who are violent towards women today. Violence 
against women has been deeply rooted in many societies throughout the ages ,134 
yet non-Aboriginal governments do not have to subject themselves to this painful 
self-criticism in order to exercise jurisdiction.135 Th e process Indigenous peoples 
would have to follow to take eff ective legislative and judicial action in this sphere 
shows a deep fl aw in Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence.
What if Aboriginal communities somehow failed to produce suffi  cient evi-
dence of pre-contact violence against women or their associated protections? It 
seems absurd even to contemplate the implications of such an argument. And 
even if the Crown managed to prove that Indigenous peoples were free of violence 
131. Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, ibid at para 46.
132. Aboriginal peoples should not have to publicly shame themselves with detailed proof 
of violence and eff ective response to take legislative and judicial action within their 
communities, particularly when this is an issue that poisons every society. See Charlotte 
Watts & Catherine Zimmerman, “Violence Against Women: Global Scope and Magnitude” 
(2002) 359 Lancet 1232; UN Study of the Secretary-General, Ending violence against women: 
from words to action (New York: UN, 2007); Andrea Parrot & Nina Cummings, Forsaken 
females: the global brutalization of women (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefi eld, 2006).
133. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 55. See also Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band, supra note 122 at 
para 46.
134. Parrot & Cummings, supra note 132.
135. For a discussion of these stereotypes in law, policy, and the media, see Robert F Berkhofer, 
Th e White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus to the Present (New 
York: Random House, 1978). 
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or lacked meaningful protections or sanctions against it, would this mean that 
such communities could not respond to the current crisis on any meaningful 
jurisdictional basis today? Th ese arguments reduce Indigenous governments and 
their constitutional status to the crudest caricatures and stereotypes, characterizing 
Indigenous peoples as innocent children of the land or as brutal, uncivilized 
savages of the forest.136 
Yet, according to the dominant reading of the Constitution, section 35(1) 
would frame discussions of violence against women in this very way. One 
would hate to think that the point of section 35(1) is to shamefully marginalize 
Indigenous governments and exclude their constitutional participation in 
addressing their most pressing legal issues—particularly when reconciliation 
and decolonization are supposed to be the constitutional goals.137 Th is cannot 
be right, particularly when one remembers that the gender equality provisions of 
section 35(4) are part of this constitutional mix. In light of the foregoing analysis, 
it is clear that the “integral to a distinctive culture test” is fatally fl awed when 
read in light of the Constitution’s broader structure and purpose, and in the face 
of present-day needs.138 
B. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND TREATIES
Now that  we have examined how violence against women would be addressed 
under the dominant Aboriginal rights jurisprudence, I will briefl y examine how 
treaty rights might be deployed to deal with the same issue. We will see that the 
Constitution’s treaty provisions are just as problematic as its so-called Aboriginal 
rights protections. Th e Court’s treaty jurisprudence also emphasizes questionable 
historic experience rather than engaging meaningfully with the real-world, 
contemporary challenges faced by Indigenous women (and Indigenous 
communities) today.
At present, treaty rights must be proven by reference to the common intention 
between the relevant parties at the time the agreement was made.139 If a claimed 
right was not “within the contemplation of the parties to the treaties,” it will not 
136. Ibid. 
137. Reconciliation as a constitutional goal within s 35(1) is discussed in Van der Peet, supra note 
24 at paras 48-49; decolonization as a constitutional goal is expressed in Côté, supra note 45 at 
paras 53, 59; Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 65. For a wide-ranging discussion of reconciliation 
and decolonization, see Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, 
Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).
138. For an alternative view, see Sharon D McIvor, “Aboriginal Women’s Rights as ‘Existing 
Rights’ (Canada)” (1995) 15:2-3 Can Woman Stud 34.
139. Marshall, supra note 24 at para 14.
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be recognized and affi  rmed under section 35(1).140 Th us, in order for Indigenous 
peoples to succeed in claiming that they exercised jurisdiction over their members 
who practiced violence towards women, they would have to prove that this 
power was naturally within the contemplation of the parties when the treaty was 
signed.141 Once this claim was proven, the Indigenous group would next have to 
establish that the specifi c manner in which Aboriginal peoples wanted to exercise 
the right was a “logical evolution” of the traditional practice contemplated by the 
signers of the treaty.142 Th e scope of such evolution, however, must occur “within 
limits [since their] subject matter cannot be wholly transformed.”143 While the 
court will interpret treaties in a large, liberal, and generous manner, resolving 
ambiguities in favour of Indigenous peoples,144 it will not recognize treaty rights 
unrelated to historic context.145   
As one might imagine, establishing Indigenous jurisdiction in relation to 
violence against women on the basis of this test would likely be diffi  cult. Th ere 
is no explicit treaty language in any agreement guaranteeing this right to Indig-
enous peoples. As a result, a court would have to inquire into whether this power 
was implied by the broader context of the treaty.146 Such intention may be diffi  cult 
to discern given that First Nations and the Crown were not often bargaining 
about the other party’s internal relations, particularly on the Indigenous 
side of the agreement;147 they were largely focused on rights to land, trade, 
and resources.148 They simply did not negotiate an entire way of life or how they 
140. Ibid at para 13.
141. Ibid at para 78.
142. R v Marshall; R v Bernard, supra note 24 at paras 13, 16, 25; R v Morris, supra note 24 at 
paras 16-32.
143. Marshall, supra note 24 at para 19.
144. Taylor and Williams, supra note 24; Simon, supra note 24; Horseman, supra note 24 at 907; Badger, 
supra note 24 at paras 4, 41; Sundown, supra note 24 at paras 24-25; Marshall, ibid at paras 9-14; 
R v Marshall; R v Bernard, supra note 24 at para 26; Morris, supra note 24 at para 19. 
145. R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025, 70 DLR (4th) 427.
146. Ibid. 
147. John J Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-
Government” (1992) 30:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 291 [Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law”]; John 
Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: Th e Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-
Government” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, 
Equity, and Respect for Diff erence (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997).
148. For general treaty histories, see Harold Cardinal & Walter Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of 
Saskatchewan: Our Dream is Th at Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000); Walter Hildebrandt et al, Th e True Spirit and 
Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996) at 133; René 
Fumoleau, As Long as this Land Shall Last: A History of Treaty 8 and Treaty 11 (Calgary: 
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would live together in the future.149 Th us, it would be exceedingly unfair to construe 
an agreement’s silences as a surrender of jurisdiction related to the health, safety, 
and welfare of women in Indigenous communities.150 
Since Indigenous peoples owned the land and exercised governance powers 
prior to European arrival, treaties should be seen as a grant of rights from First 
Nations to the Crown, reserving to the First Nations all rights not so granted. 
On this view, First Nations would have retained broad jurisdiction over matters 
not ceded through negotiations.151 Women’s rights were likely not within the 
contemplation of non-Aboriginal negotiators when treaties were signed, given 
the troubling attitudes towards women in English common law.152 While courts 
may attempt to construe the peace and order clauses in the numbered treaties 
as recognizing jurisdiction in this broad way,153 the SCC has warned that 
University of Calgary Press, 2004) at 74, 133, 240, 257, 314, 340, 502; Arthur J Ray, JR 
Miller & Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000) at 116-17; William C Wicken, Mi’kmaq Treaties 
on Trial: History, Land and Donald Marshall Junior (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2002).
149. See generally JR Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
150. Silence in treaties is not to be construed against Indians. See R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 
supra note 24 at para 104; R v Sioui, supra note 145. Courts require “strict proof of the fact 
of extinguishment.” Badger, supra note 24 at para 41. Th e Crown has the onus of proving 
that it clearly and plainly intended to extinguish an Aboriginal or treaty right and the “clear 
and plain” hurdle for extinguishment is quite high. Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 133. 
For further discussion of the development of Indian canons of construction, see Leonard 
Rotman, “Taking Aim at the Canons of Treaty Interpretation in Canadian Aboriginal Rights 
Jurisprudence” (1997) 46 UNBLJ 1.
151. United States v Winans (1905), 198 US 371 at 381, 25 S Ct 662. Th e US Supreme Court 
stated: “In other words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of 
rights from them - a reservation of those not granted.”
152. For instance, the legal right for a man to “beat” his wife was only removed from English law 
in 1891. See R v Jackson, [1891] 1 QB 671 at 682, 7 TLR 382 (CA). For a discussion of 
women’s rights under the common law during this period, see Lori Chambers, “‘So Entirely 
Under His Power and Control’: Th e Status of Wives before Reform” in Lori Chambers, ed, 
Married Women and Property Law in Victorian Ontario (Toronto: Th e Osgoode Society for 
Canadian Legal History, 1997) 14; Sarah Carter, “Categories and Terrains of Exclusion: 
Constructing the ‘Indian Woman’ in the Early Settlement Era in Western Canada” in 
Catherine Cavanaugh & Randi Warne, eds, Telling Tales: Essays in Western Women’s History 
(Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000) 60; Constance Backhouse, Carnal Crimes: Sexual Assault 
Law in Canada, 1900–1975 (Toronto: Th e Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 
2008); Petticoats & Prejudice: Women and Law in Nineteenth Century Canada, (Toronto: Th e 
Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1991).
153. For insight into eyewitness interpretations of these agreements, see Peter Erasmus, Buff alo 
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“‘[g]enerous’ rules of interpretation should not be confused with a vague sense of 
after-the-fact largesse.” 154 Given the judiciary’s hesitancy to recognize broad juris-
diction in relation to other claims,155 it is unlikely that treaties will be a source of 
Indigenous power to deal with violence against women.156 Like the jurisprudence 
on Aboriginal rights, this too represents a signifi cant fl aw in Canada’s current 
reading of the Constitution.
III. ALTERNATIVE SECTION 35(1) INTERPRETATIONS: 
(AB)ORIGINALISM AND LIVING TREES
As the above review demonstrates, the Court’s dominant interpretation of treaty 
rights under section 35(1) contains many similarities to the test for Aboriginal 
rights. In order to succeed, claims in both categories must be rooted in historical 
understandings of the right at the time of European interaction (through either 
contact or negotiation). Th ere are signifi cant problems with this approach, as 
discussed above. Fortunately, genuine alternatives are available when construing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights within the existing jurisprudence that would 
allow Indigenous peoples to possess greater responsibility for addressing violence 
against women. Th ere are at least two related strands of contemporary law that 
could be applied to hold that Indigenous peoples retain rights to exercise jurisdiction 
in relation to violence against women.
First, the courts could reject the idea that Aboriginal and treaty rights must 
be solely rooted in the past.157 Th ey could instead apply living tree jurisprudence 
Days and Nights (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1976) at 248-49; Alexander Morris, 
Th e Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West Territories Including 
the Negotiations on Which they are Based, and Other Information Relating Th ereto (Toronto: 
Willing and Williamson, 1880) at 101-02.
154. Marshall, supra note 24.
155. Beattie v Canada (Minister of Indian Aff airs and Northern Development), 1998 1 FC 104, 
[1997] FCJ 745; Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation, supra note 28; Conseil des Innus 
de Pessamit v Assoc des policiers et policières de Pessamit, 2010 FCA 306, [2010] FCJ No 1377; 
Pamajewon, supra note 25.
156. Treaties “cannot be wholly transformed” by engaging in an “extended interpretation” of 
their original meaning. See Marshall, supra note 24 at para 19. Th is view was reinforced in 
R v Bernard where the SCC observed that an Aboriginal group’s historic “activity must be 
essentially the same” as that occurring in the past in order for it to receive recognition. See 
2005 SCC 43 at para 25, [2005] 2 SCR 220. 
157. See John Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” (2012) 58 Sup Ct L Rev 
351 (for a discussion of the ideas developed in this section) [Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism”]. 
Th e argument in the next three paragraphs, including reproduction of selected arguments in 
the text and footnotes, is derived from the same source.
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in recognizing and affi  rming Aboriginal and treaty rights under section 35(1). 
Living tree reasoning is the dominant mode of constitutional interpretation in 
Canada.158 Sadly, Indigenous peoples have not been allowed to litigate claims in 
accordance with this doctrine.159 Section 35(1) jurisprudence has been developed 
and applied in a discriminatory manner that places Indigenous peoples outside 
the constitutional mainstream. Interpreting Aboriginal and treaty rights through 
the same lens as other constitutional provisions would allow Indigenous peoples 
to exercise jurisdiction in relation to violence against women.  
Aboriginal and treaty rights are not interpreted in the same way as other 
constitutional provisions: Aboriginal peoples can only possess constitutional 
rights if they are rooted in the past.160 Th is is not true of other rights in Canada. 
Th is mode of interpretation has elsewhere been called originalism.161 Originalism 
158. A series of essays can be found on this topic in Ian Peach et al, eds, A Living Tree: Th e Legacy 
of 1982 in Canada’s Political Evolution (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2007). Numerous cases 
also uphold the dominance of living tree jurisprudence. See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 
2004 SCC 79 at para 22, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Reference re Same-Sex Marriage]; British 
Columbia (AG) v Ellett Estate, [1980] 2 SCR 466 at 478-79, 112 DLR (3d) 59 [Ellett Estate]; 
Canada (AG) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 94, [2007] 1 SCR 429; Re Residential Tenancies 
Act, 1979, [1981] 1 SCR 714 at 723, 1981 CanLII 24; Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British 
Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] 2 SCR 486 at para 52, 24 DLR (4th) 536 [Reference re Motor 
Vehicle Act]; Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can), ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 at para 
9, [2005] 2 SCR 669; Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 SCR 158 
at para 41, 81 DLR (4th) 16 [Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries]; R v Demers, 2004 
SCC 46 at para 78, [2004] 2 SCR 489; Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 
at para 23, [2007] 2 SCR 3; Ontario Home Builders’ Assn v York Region Board of Education, 
[1996] 2 SCR 929 at para 145, 137 DLR (4th) 449.
159. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at paras 39-40, [2003] 2 SCR 236 (seemingly foreclosing “living 
tree” interpretations of section 35(1)).
160. Aboriginal and treaty rights are contingent upon a court constructing an original public 
meaning for a past event, when such rights were fi rst ‘recognized.’ See Van der Peet, supra 
note 24 at para 28. Courts also look at when rights ‘crystallized.’ See Delgamuukw, supra note 
24 at para 145. Otherwise, courts look to whether rights were ‘contemplated by the parties.’ 
See Marshall, supra note 24 at paras 58, 60. For a critique of the crystallization theory of 
Aboriginal rights, see John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v 
British Columbia” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall LJ 537 at 558.
161. For a discussion of originalism in the US context, see Robert H Bork, Th e Tempting of America: 
Th e Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Touchstone, 1990); Randy E Barnett, Restoring 
the Lost Constitution: Th e Presumption of Liberty (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); 
Steven G Calabresi, ed, Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate (Washington DC: Regnery, 
2007); Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) (for 
an account of new originalism). For academic discussion of originalism in the Canadian 
context, see Grant Huscroft & Bradley W Miller, eds, Th e Challenge of Originalism: Th eories of 
Constitutional Interpretation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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holds that parties cannot claim constitutional rights unless they were contem-
plated by the constitution’s founders, or expressed or implied in public debates 
at the time when such provisions came into existence.162 Th e application of 
originalism to Indigenous peoples is ironic because the SCC has explicitly 
repudiated this doctrine in all other fi elds.163 In fact, it has boldly written that 
“[t]his Court has never adopted the practice more prevalent in the United States 
of basing constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of the framers 
of the Constitution.”164 While constitutional rights of all stripes fi nd their genesis 
in some historic moment, only Aboriginal peoples’ constitutional rights are limited 
by such moments. Th us, originalism is inconsistent with Canada’s dominant 
interpretive practices,165 which read the Constitution as a living tree.166 
Interpreting section 35(1) as part of Canada’s living tree would help eliminate 
the fl aws described above in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights.167 Living 
162. A Constitution’s public meaning and its founders’ intentions are not usually easy to agree 
upon within an originalist framework. Jack M Balkin observes that: “Conceived most 
broadly, ‘meaning’ includes a vast array of cultural associations, traditions, conventions, 
and background assumptions.” See “Nine Perspectives on Living Originalism” (2012) 3 
U Ill L Rev 815 at 828. Also see Paul Brest, “Th e Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding” (1980) 60 BUL Rev 204; Mitchell N Berman, “Originalism Is Bunk” (2009) 
84:1 NYL R 1; David A Strauss, Th e Living Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010); Robert W Bennett & Lawrence B Solum, Constitutional originalism: a debate (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011); Th omas B Colby, “Th e Sacrifi ce of the New Originalism” 
(2011) 99:3 Geo LJ 713.
163. See Justice Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” in Grant Huscroft 
& Ian Brodie, eds, Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 
2004) 345. Furthermore, the SCC did not respond positively to interpreting the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in light of the drafters’ intent. See Reference re Motor Vehicle 
Act, supra note 158 at paras 49-50. 
164. Ontario Hydro v Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] 3 SCR 327 at para 150, 107 DLR 
(4th) 457. Academic commentary has also maintained that “originalism has never enjoyed 
any signifi cant support in Canada.” See Peter W Hogg, “Canada: From Privy Council to 
Supreme Court” in Jeff rey Goldsworthy, ed, Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 55 at 83. But see Adam M Dodek, “Th e Dutiful 
Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s Conception of Charter Rights and Th eir 
Limits” (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev 331; Bradley W Miller, “Beguiled By Metaphors: Th e 
‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22:2 Can JL & 
Jur 331.
165. Justice Binnie, supra note 163 at 348.
166. See Edwards v Attorney-General for Canada, [1930] AC 124 at para 44, [1929] UKPC 86. 
167. At signifi cant points in history, Indigenous peoples have also understood their constitutional 
relations in living tree terms. See William N Fenton, Th e Great Law and the Longhouse: a 
political history of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1998) at 73, 103. 
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tree constitutionalism would allow courts to appropriately recognize and defer 
to historic intentions and meanings at the time of contact or treaty but would 
not exclude other “living” meanings that may be attributed to them.168 Th is 
approach would respect historical context and guarantees while also bringing 
the contemporary “living tree” conception to the forefront. A methodology that 
venerates past and present human rights guarantees would be more consistent 
with Canada’s Constitution than exclusive reliance on the “integral to a distinctive 
culture” or “historic contemplation of the parties” tests currently dominating 
section 35(1) jurisprudence.
If living tree principles were applied to Indigenous peoples, we might one 
day say about Canada’s Aboriginal and treaty rights jurisprudence what has been 
written about other areas of constitutional law: “Th is metaphor has endured 
as the preferred approach in constitutional interpretation [dealing with Aboriginal 
and treaty rights], ensuring ‘that Confederation can be adapted to new social 
realities.’”169 We would have an Aboriginal jurisprudence that holds that “‘frozen 
concepts’ reasoning runs contrary to one of the most fundamental principles 
of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our Constitution is a  living 
tree which, by way of progressive interpretation, accommodates and addresses the 
realities of modern life.”170 We would also apply the view that “[t]here is nothing 
static or frozen, narrow or technical, about the Constitution of Canada.”171 
Th us, with respect to Aboriginal and treaty rights, we would say: “If the Canadian 
Constitution is to be regarded as a ‘living tree’ and legislative competence as 
‘essentially dynamic’…then the determination of categories existing in 1867 
becomes of little, other than historic, concern.”172 Th is would allow us to reinforce 
an approach that holds that “the past plays a critical but nonexclusive role in 
determining the content of the rights and freedoms” within the Constitution.”173 
As such, we could conclude in relation to Aboriginal and treaty rights: “Th e tree 
is rooted in past and present institutions, but must be capable of growth to meet 
168. First Nations often described their constitutional relations by reference to living forces. 
For example, treaties were to be for as long as the “sun shines, the river fl ows and the grass 
grows.” When Alexander Morris proposed Treaty 6 he said: “What I trust and hope we will 
do is not for to-day or to-morrow only; what I will promise and what I believe and hope you 
will take, is to last as long as that sun shines and yonder river fl ows.” See supra note 155 at 
202. See also ibid at 51 (for similar wording during Treaty 3 negotiations). 
169. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, supra note 158 at para 42.
170. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 158 at para 22.
171. Ellett Estate, supra note 158 at para 29.
172. Ibid [emphasis in original].
173. Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries, supra note 158 at para 42.
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the future.”174 If originalism were rejected in favour of living tree constitutionalism, 
Aboriginal and treaty rights would be more strongly rooted in “a philosophy 
which is capable of explaining the past and animating the future.”175 Interpreting 
Aboriginal and treaty rights as living traditions would mark an important 
maturation point in the ongoing evolution of Canada’s organic Constitution.176 
Th is would rank in signifi cance alongside the achievement of responsible government, 
the extension of women’s political rights, and the extension of civil rights before 
the Charter came into force.177 We must not “read the provisions of the Constitution 
like a last will and testament lest it become one.”178 Th is applies as much to 
Aboriginal and treaty rights regarding violence against women as it does to other 
parts of Canada’s Constitution.179    
Th ere is a second way of curing the fl aws in the current approach to section 
35(1) and thereby allowing Indigenous peoples to exercise jurisdiction over 
violence against women in a manner consistent with section 35(4). Th is approach 
is based on a related jurisprudential strand that regards broad jurisdictional 
Aboriginal rights claims as pre-dating the creation of Canada and continuing 
through to the present day. Courts have at times assumed that Indigenous peoples 
exercised governance powers prior to Crown assertions of sovereignty without 
requiring strict proof of such power.180 Th ese are reasonable assumptions given 
how jurisdiction is generally treated in the wider Canadian context.181 Th is is 
also the legal justifi cation for the exercise of Native self-governance in the United 
States.182 Th is approach is also present within Canadian jurisprudence and could 
174. Ibid.
175. Ibid.
176. John T Saywell, Th e Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 118-21.
177. William Kaplan, State and Salvation: Th e Jehovah’s Witnesses and Th eir Fight for Civil Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 
DLR (2d) 689; Reference Re Alberta Statutes, [1938] SCR 100, 2 DLR 81; Saumur v City 
of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299, [1953] 4 DLR 641; Switzman v Elbling, [1957] SCR 285, 7 
DLR (2d) 337.
178. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, 
[1984] 2 SCR 145 at 155, 11 DLR (4th) 641.
179. Th is paragraph is taken from Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism,” supra note 157 at 397-98. 
180. Chief Justice Lamer observed that Imperial powers treated Indians as independent nations. 
Sioui, supra note 145 at para 69. 
181. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 at 
para 32 [Haida Nation].
182. United States Department of the Interior, Handbook of Federal Indian Law by Felix S 
Cohen (Washington: Department of Interior, 1941) at 122-23; Charles Wilkinson, American 
Indians, Time and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) at 60.
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rightly be regarded as undergirding Indigenous jurisdictional issues in this fi eld.183 
For example, these powers were evident in Calder v AGBC, wherein Justice 
Judson wrote: “[T]he fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, 
organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for 
centuries.”184 Organization is essential to governance.185 Th e fact that Indigenous 
peoples were “organized in societies” prior to the arrival of Europeans implies that 
Indigenous governance, which includes the power to deal with violence against 
women (in an admittedly imperfect way),186 was an important element of their 
“pre-contact” societies.187 Th ese governance powers were not voluntarily surrendered 
as a result of the Crown’s own assertion of sovereignty.188 As has been noted, 
Indigenous peoples continued to exercise their powers of governance after the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty in many ways.189 Moreover, they continue to live 
in “organized societies” in the present day by governing themselves in accordance 
with their customs, laws, and traditions,190 though there has been extensive regulation 
of these powers through instruments such as the Indian Act.191 Fortunately, as the 
SCC noted in Sparrow, “that the right is controlled in great detail by the regulations 
does not mean that the right is thereby extinguished.”192 
Indigenous jurisdiction over violence against women could thus be 
recognized under Canadian law through a broader reading of the doctrine of 
continuity.193 As Chief Justice McLachlin succinctly stated in Haida Nation, 
183. Slattery, “Th e Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights,” supra note 26 at 6.
184. Calder v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313 at 328, 1973 CanLII 4 
[emphasis added]. 
185. Th is paragraph is largely extracted from John Borrows, “Tracking Trajectories: Aboriginal 
Governance as an Aboriginal Right” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 285 at 292-93.
186. Robert A Williams Jr, “Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Legacy of White 
Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context” (1990) 24:4 Ga L Rev 1019.
187. Th e reserved rights theory of Aboriginal governance is also consistent with the proposition 
articulated by the SCC in Van der Peet, supra note 24 at para 30.  
188. However, it has been held that “discovery” diminished Indian rights to land. See Guerin v 
Canada [1984] 2 SCR 335 at para 88, 13 DLR (4th) 321.
189. Th e SCC accepted the idea in Sioui, supra note 145. Th e Court cites Worcester v State of 
Georgia, 31 US 515, 8 L Ed 483 (1832). 
190. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, supra note 120 at 196; John Borrows, “Stewardship and the 
First Nations Governance Act” (2003) 29:1 Queen’s LJ 103.
191. For example, First Nations exercise pre-existing governance powers through the Indian 
custom council system under the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5. Th e legislation makes 
reference to “custom of the band” (at s 2(1)). 
192. Sparrow, supra note 45 at para 36. For an application of this principle in a specifi c 
community context, see Borrows, “A Genealogy of Law,” supra note 147.
193. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 41. Numerous cases have proceeded 
under the doctrine of continuity. See Johnstone v Connolly (1869), 17 RJRQ 266, 1 CNLC 
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“[p]ut simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and 
were never conquered.”194 Th e Canadian government has also recognized an 
approach to Aboriginal self-government that draws upon the doctrine of continuity.195 
Th ese views assume the existence of Indigenous governance powers and bring life 
to Canada’s living tree, thereby correcting fl aws in current interpretive approaches.196 
As Chief Justice McLachlin wrote in Mitchell:
European settlement did not terminate the interests of aboriginal peoples arising 
from their historical occupation and use of the land. To the contrary, aboriginal 
interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, 
and were absorbed into the common law as rights.197
Indigenous women should be able to claim Aboriginal rights to safety within 
their societies under the doctrine of continuity. Th is approach does not require 
Indigenous peoples to prove historical exercise of each small increment of juris-
diction under the “integral to a distinctive culture” test. It also demonstrates that 
Canada’s Constitution does not have to be read in ways that are inconsistent with 
its broader aims. Pamajewon will not be the last word in defi ning Aboriginal 
governance rights under section 35(1),198 and the prominence of the doctrine 
of continuity can be an important antidote to the fl aws outlined earlier in 
this section.199
151 (CA), aff ’g Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75, 1 CNLC 70 (Qc Sup Ct); R v 
Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889), 1 Terr LR 211, 1889 CarswellNWT 14 (WL Can) (NWT CA); R 
v Bone (1899), 4 Terr LR 173, 3 CCC 329 (NWT SC); Re Noah Estate (1961), 32 DLR (2d) 
185, 36 WWR 577 (NWT TC); Re Deborah E4-789, [1972] 5 WWR 203, 28 DLR (3d) 
483 (NWT CA); Michell v Dennis and Dennis, [1984] 2 CNLR 91, 2 WWR 449 (BC SC); 
Casimel v Insurance Corp of British Columbia (1991), 58 BCLR (2d) 316, [1992] 1 CNLR 
84 (SC); Vielle v Vielle (1992), 93 DLR (4th) 318, [1993] 1 CNLR 165 (Alta Prov Ct (Fam 
Div)).
194. Haida Nation, supra note 181 at para 24.
195. Th e federal government has recognized that Aboriginal peoples possess unextinguished 
inherent rights to govern themselves. See Canada, Minister of Indian Aff airs and Northern 
Development, Aboriginal Self-Government: Th e Government of Canada’s Approach to 
Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government 
(Ottawa: Indian and Northern Aff airs Canada, 1995), online: <http://www.aadnc-aandc.
gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844>.
196. For an example of the wide scope of Aboriginal governance powers under the doctrine of 
continuity, see Campbell v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2000 BCSC 1123 at paras 
65-81, 189 DLR (4th) 333.
197. Mitchell, supra note 24 at para 10.
198. Chief Justice Lamer expressed hesitation in applying the “integral to a distinctive culture” test 
to the claim of self-government. See Delgamuukw, supra note 24 at paras 170-71.
199. Slattery, “Th e Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights,” supra note 26 at 20-48.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Violence against women should not be labelled an Indigenous tradition.200 It is 
a very complex and serious socio-legal issue that has signifi cant implications for 
how jurisdiction, law, and legal traditions are taught, practiced, critiqued, and 
reformulated.201 Th is article has argued that violence against Indigenous women 
must be confronted at all levels of society. In particular, this issue must be 
addressed from a jurisdictional perspective since violence is linked to the inequalities 
Indigenous peoples face within Indigenous communities and in Canadian society 
more generally. Unfortunately, at least two stereotypes stand in the way of such 
action. One is the misperception that Indigenous communities would be 
incapable of eff ectively addressing this issue due the high levels of violence they 
encounter. Th e second relates to the courts’ interpretive misperception that history 
must be the sole source of Indigenous jurisdictional claims under section 35(1) 
of the Constitution. While important truths underlie each viewpoint (violence 
within communities does raise distinct challenges in dealing with this issue, and 
attentiveness to history is crucial, though not determinative, in understanding 
Aboriginal and treaty rights), they do not justify the cramped and distorted 
approach to Indigenous jurisdiction over violence against women that characterizes 
contemporary constitutional jurisprudence in Canada. Th is article has attempted 
to calibrate more precisely a nuanced approach to these issues in light of broader 
policy and jurisprudential realities.202
200. Andrea Smith, “Not an Indian Tradition: Th e Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples” (2003) 
18:2 Hypatia 70.
201. Val Napoleon, Hadley Friedland & Emily Snyder, eds, Th inking About and Practicing With 
Indigenous Legal Traditions: One Approach: A Community Handbook [on fi le with author].
202. Th e teaching of Indigenous legal traditions in Canadian law schools must also draw on the 
insights developed in this article. Gender and the elimination of violence against women 
is a necessary site of inquiry and action for working with Indigenous peoples’ own laws. 
Tradition, whether Aboriginal or Canadian, must not be essentialized nor regarded as 
being homogenous, objective, neutral, or necessarily equality-enhancing just because it is 
“tradition.” We must constantly subject all our laws to these inquiries in order to ensure that 
all to whom they apply are safe from violence in any form. 
